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The International Market for Contracts:  
The Most Attractive Contract Laws 
 
By Gilles Cuniberti* 
 
Abstract: This Article aims to contribute to a better understanding of the 
international contracting process by unveiling the factors that influence 
international commercial actors when they choose the law that governs their 
transactions.  Based on an empirical study of more than 4,400 international 
contracts by approximately 12,000 parties who participated in arbitrations 
under the aegis of the International Chamber of Commerce, this Article offers 
a method of measuring the international attractiveness of contract laws.  It 
shows that parties’ preferences are homogenous and that the laws of five 
jurisdictions dominate the international market for contracts.  Among them, 
two are chosen three times more often than their closest competitors: English 
and Swiss laws.  This Article then inquires which features made English and 
Swiss laws more attractive than other jurisdictions’ laws and seeks to verify 
whether the postulate is true that international commercial parties are 
rational actors.  It concludes that while some parties might have the resources 
to study the content of available laws before deciding which one to choose, 
others have no intention of investing such resources and are happy to rely on 
cheaper means to assess the content of foreign laws, including proxies.  
Furthermore, some parties suffer from cognitive limitations, the most 
important of which is parties’ fear of the unknown and their correlative need 
to select a law resembling their own.  Finally, unsophisticated parties might 
not fully appreciate the extent of their freedom to choose the law governing 
their transaction and might wrongly believe that it is constrained by largely 
irrelevant factors such as the venue of the arbitration.  
 
* Professor of Private International Law, University of Luxembourg; J.D., M.A., Ph.D. (Law), 
Panthéon-Sorbonne University; LL.M., Yale Law School.  I am grateful to Sir Roy Goode, 
Avery Katz, Stefan Vogenauer, Laurent Hirsch, George Bermann, Joshua Fischman, and the 
faculty workshop participants at the University of Luxembourg and Singapore Management 
University for commenting on earlier drafts of this Article.  Many thanks to Christian Deprez 
and Catherine Warin for great research assistance, and to Suzanne Larsen and Maxi Scherer 
who have helped in various ways.  All errors are mine. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Parties to international business transactions may freely choose 
the law governing their contract.  Particularly in the context of 
international commercial arbitration, parties’ freedom of choice is 
not limited by a requirement that the chosen law be connected to the 
transaction or, for that matter, to the parties themselves.1  As a result, 
sophisticated parties are free to choose a contract law that best fits 
their needs, irrespective of its connection to the particular 
transaction.  Accordingly, more attractive laws might frequently be 
chosen, bringing additional business to the lawyers trained in that 
particular law.  Such success might also create an international 
market for contracts in which lawyers and states could opt to 
compete. 
In recent years, some national lawyers’ associations have 
competed for international contracts through marketing materials that 
promote their contract law.  The Law Society for England and Wales 
initiated the practice when, in 2007, it issued a brochure promoting 
England and Wales as the Jurisdiction of Choice.2  In 2008, the 
German federal Ministry of Justice, in conjunction with the German 
legal professions, published a similar brochure praising German law 
in general and German contract law in particular.3  These marketing 
efforts demonstrate that elites in at least some jurisdictions believe 
that there is an international market for contracts in which it is worth 
competing. 
In 2009, Geoffrey Miller and Theodore published the results of 
an empirical study of U.S. domestic contracts that involved publicly 
held companies.  This study revealed a robust market for large 
commercial contracts in the United States dominated by New York.4  Is 
there a comparable market for international contracts?  Do international 
commercial parties provide for laws other than their own? 
This Article offers an empirical study of more than 4,400 
 
1 See infra notes 13–14 and accompanying text.  The same freedom is less common in the 
context of international litigation.  For instance, it exists in the European Union.  See Rome I 
Regulation, 593/2008, art. 3, 2008 O.J. (L 177) 6, but not in the United States.  See infra note 14. 
2 LAW SOC’Y OF ENGLAND & WALES, ENGLAND AND WALES: THE JURISDICTION OF 
CHOICE (2007). 
3 BUS. OFFICE OF THE ALLIANCE FOR GERMAN LAW, LAW—MADE IN GERMANY: 
GLOBAL, EFFECTIVE, COST-EFFICIENT (2d ed. 2012). 
4 Geoffrey P. Miller & Theodore Eisenberg, The Market for Contracts, 30 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 2073 (2009) [hereinafter Miller & Eisenberg, Market for Contracts]; Theodore Eisenberg 
& Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight to New York: An Empirical Study of Choice of Law and 
Choice of Forum Clauses in Publicly-Held Companies’ Contracts, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1475 
(2009) [hereinafter Eisenberg & Miller, Flight to New York]. 
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international contracts concluded by close to 12,000 parties based on 
an analysis of data published by the International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC) regarding contractual practices used in ICC 
arbitrations (the “ICC Arbitration Data”).  This is, by far, the largest 
study of international contractual practices ever conducted.  Previous 
comparable studies were limited to samples of a few hundred arbitral 
awards or interviews of practitioners.5 
This Article offers two important contributions.  First, it 
provides empirical evidence of the existence of a market for 
international contracts comparable to the market currently found in 
the United States.  This Article also attempts to assess the market for 
international contracts’ actual size: it might be as large as 30% of all 
international contracts.  If there is evidence that parties to 
international commercial transactions often choose to apply a 
contract law other than their own, the next question is which contract 
laws do such parties choose?  Given the diversity of such parties, one 
might expect their preferences to be heterogeneous. 
This Article’s second contribution is to provide empirical 
evidence that such parties’ preferences are quite homogenous and 
that the laws of a small number of jurisdictions dominate the 
international market for contracts.  More precisely, this study reveals 
that, when international commercial parties select a law other than 
their own, they generally choose the law of one of five jurisdictions. 
However, these five jurisdictions are not equally attractive to 
international parties: two are chosen three times more frequently, and 
thus, considered market leaders.  This Article also offers a method 
for measuring these contract laws’ international attractiveness.  
Using that method, I determined that the attractiveness of these laws 
ranks as follows: 
 
 
5 See Stefan Vogenauer, Perceptions of Civil Justice Systems in Europe and Their 
Implications for Choice of Forum and Choice of Contract Law: An Empirical Analysis, in 
CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEMS IN EUROPE: IMPLICATIONS FOR CHOICE OF FORUM AND CHOICE OF 
CONTRACT LAW 1 (Stefan Vogenauer & C. Hodges eds., forthcoming 2014) (survey of 100 
businesses); Stefan Voigt, Are International Merchants Stupid? Their Choice of Law Sheds 
Doubt on the Legal Origin Theory, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1 (2008) (580 awards); Stefan 
Vogenauer & Stephen Weatherill, The European Community’s Competence to Pursue the 
Harmonisation of Contract Law—An Empirical Contribution to the Debate, in 
HARMONISATION OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW: IMPLICATIONS FOR EUROPEAN PRIVATE 
LAWS, BUSINESS AND PRACTICE 105 (Stefan Vogenauer & Stephen Weatherill eds., 2006) 
(survey of 175 businesses); Corinne Truong, The Law Applicable to the Merits in International 
Distribution Contracts: An Analysis of ICC Arbitral Awards, 12 INT’L CT. OF ARB. BULL. 37 
(2001) (141 awards). 
CUNIBERTI_FINAL_WORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/3/14 7:23 PM 
The International Market for Contracts 
34:455 (2014) 
 
459 
Type 2007–2012 
English Law 11.20 
Swiss Law 9.91 
U.S. State Laws 3.56 
French Law 3.14 
German Law 2.03 
 
Part II of this Article presents the ICC Arbitration Data and 
explains the methodology used in this study. 
Part III seeks explanations for the observation that English and 
Swiss laws are around three times more attractive to international 
commercial actors than U.S., French, or German contract laws.  
Intuitively, assuming most international commercial actors are 
sophisticated, their more frequent choice of English or Swiss law 
might suggest that those contract laws afford rules that are better 
suited to the actors’ interests.  There are, however, a number of 
factors other than the intrinsic qualities of specific contract laws that 
might influence the parties’ choice of law in international contracts.  
First, I consider what these extrinsic factors might be.  I then explore 
whether the intrinsic qualities of English and Swiss law fully explain 
their international attractiveness.  I conclude that no extrinsic or 
intrinsic factors, by themselves, can explain my findings.  In 
particular, there is no discernable particularity shared by English and 
Swiss law that explains their international attractiveness. 
Finally, in Part IV, I consider whether my results could be 
explained by distinguishing different categories of parties that might 
have different preferences and, therefore, might rely on different 
factors for the purpose of choosing the law that governs their 
contract.  I conclude that, while international commercial parties 
might have similar preferences, these parties address choice of law 
differently for three reasons.  First, they might want to invest 
different resources in the process of selecting the applicable law.  
While some parties may be ready to incur the costs of determining 
the content of foreign law, others might want to assess the quality of 
foreign laws through less rigorous but cheaper means.  Second, their 
rationality might be bounded by a number of considerations, the most 
important of which being the fear of the unknown and the correlative 
need for selecting a law resembling their own.  Third, 
unsophisticated parties might not fully appreciate the extent of their 
freedom to choose the law governing their transaction and might 
wrongly believe that it is constrained by largely irrelevant factors 
such as the venue of the arbitration. 
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II.  THE STUDY OF 4,427 INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS 
 
A.  The Sample 
 
This Article analyzes empirical evidence on commercial parties’ 
choice of contract law in international transactions.  At the outset, it 
must be conceded that the study of international contractual practices 
presents numerous methodological difficulties.  The first and most 
obvious difficulty comes from a lack of access to the relevant data.  
Public information is scarce.  Many commercial contracts are subject 
to confidentiality clauses.  Moreover, private commercial parties are 
typically not obligated to make their contracts public even when no 
confidentiality clause exists.6  A second difficulty is the sheer 
volume of international commercial contracts executed around the 
world.  The total number is undoubtedly enormous, which raises 
questions about the representativeness of any sample considered as 
part of an empirical study. 
Acknowledging these methodological difficulties, this Article 
posits that the statistics published by the International Court of 
Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce—the ICC 
Arbitration Data7—are meaningful for the purpose of empirically 
studying the contractual practices of international commercial 
parties.8  The ICC is one of very few institutions involved in 
international commerce, and may be the only one to publish data on 
the subject.  Most other arbitral institutions do not.9  Considered the 
 
6 In some circumstances, applicable law may compel certain types of commercial actors to 
publish some of their contracts (in whole or in part), but these contracts could, at best, only aid 
in understanding the practices of those subject to such requirement.  Moreover, the contracts 
might not be international.  For instance, U.S. law requires publicly traded companies to 
publish portions of certain types of contracts, a review of which revealed that they were 
typically domestic.  See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, Ex Ante Choices of Law and 
Forum: An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Merger Agreements, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1975 (2006). 
7 The ICC Data is published each year in the ICC International Court of Arbitration 
Bulletin.  All ICC Data cited throughout this Article for a given year is thus available in one of 
the early issues of the ICC International Court of Arbitration Bulletin for the following year. 
8 For a prior analysis of data for year 2008, see Voigt, supra note 5.  Voigt’s project was 
different, however, because his aim was not to assess the international attractiveness of contract 
laws, but rather to challenge the legal origin theory developed by La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, 
Shleifer, and Vishny.  See, e.g., Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 
1113 (1998). 
9 I have personally contacted the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce and the London Court 
of International Arbitration, which both declined to provide statistics to me.  Although no 
reason was given, the most likely is that none of these institutions has collected such data.  One 
exception is the Swiss Chambers’ Arbitration Institution, which has begun publishing statistics 
in 2011.  I discuss those statistics below in the text accompanying notes 55–60.  Finally, two 
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leading arbitral institution in the world for settling international 
commercial disputes, the ICC handles between 600 and 800 
commercial disputes each year.  This study focuses on the period 
from 2007 to 2012, during which the ICC provided precise data on 
more than 4,400 international contracts.  From my perspective, the 
sample is of a reasonable size to draw some conclusions about 
international commercial practices. 
 
1.  Arbitral Awards as Data on Contractual Practices 
 
At the outset, it must be acknowledged that the ICC Arbitration 
Data only concerns contracts that gave rise to disputes requiring 
external resolution.  Unlike these contracts, most commercial 
contracts do not require external resolution.  It could, therefore, be 
argued that the ICC Arbitration Data is not representative of 
international commercial contracts in general, but only of those 
which give rise to disputes that could not be resolved without resort 
to external dispute resolution.  Such disputes may arise out of the 
particular contracts precisely because of clauses they contain, which 
might incentivize the parties to seek external resolution.  These 
clauses might include choice of law clauses.  Thus, one might argue 
that the ICC Arbitration Data does not reveal those laws which 
commercial parties generally prefer, so much as those laws which are 
preferred by parties who eventually sue each other.  Taking that 
argument to its logical conclusion, this could mean that some laws 
would be prone to require external dispute resolution while others 
would not. 
While this hypothesis cannot be excluded, I have not found a 
study that suggests its veracity.  Rather, this Article might provide 
evidence that this hypothesis should be rejected.  Arguably, some 
laws might be more prone to require external dispute resolution 
because they lack precision.  Conversely, laws affording detailed and 
precise rules should be less prone to require external dispute 
resolution and, therefore, should not be well represented in contracts 
that end up in arbitration.10  However, English law is often described 
as one of the most precise and detailed contract laws in the world.  If 
the choice of the law governing contracts significantly impacted the 
external dispute resolution rate, one would expect English law to do 
 
Asian arbitral institutions have recently agreed to provide data on choice of law to me.  The 
author is currently working on a paper presenting and analyzing them. 
10 Precise rules should make the outcome of litigation predictable and, therefore, more 
likely to give to the parties an incentive to settle any disagreement by negotiation without 
incurring litigation costs. 
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poorly in any study based on disputed cases.  However, in this study, 
it ranks first as the law chosen by commercial actors resorting to 
external dispute resolution.11 
A second peculiarity with respect to the ICC Arbitration Data is 
that the international contracts it includes gave rise to disputes, which 
the parties agreed to arbitrate rather than litigate.  Commercial 
contracts providing for arbitration are likely to differ from other 
contracts in one important respect: their average value is likely to be 
much higher.  This is because, in most countries, arbitration is 
significantly more expensive than litigation.  Arbitrators must be 
compensated, and attorneys often charge higher fees.12  As a result, 
one might assume that sophisticated parties provide for arbitration 
only when a certain minimum value is at stake.13  The link between 
this monetary issue and the parties’ choice of law, however, seems 
tenuous.  Nevertheless, one might reasonably believe that 
sophisticated commercial actors in high-stake transactions are far 
less likely than parties in lower-stake transactions to leave the choice 
of law governing their contracts to the vagaries of private 
international law.  Rather, such parties are far more likely to invest 
their resources in negotiating an acceptable choice of applicable law 
provision.  Thus, the ICC Arbitration Data may actually be much 
more meaningful than a sample of international cases adjudicated in 
national courts. 
 
11 Of course, it is possible that the study will still understate the attractiveness of English 
law, which might be underrepresented in the ICC Arbitration Data as contracts governed by 
English law may be less likely to give rise to disputes (or at least disputes that require external 
dispute resolution) than others. 
12 This statement might come as a surprise to many U.S. lawyers, as the United States is 
one of the few, if not the only jurisdiction where arbitration is perceived as a cheaper mode of 
dispute resolution.  However, litigation is much cheaper in civil law jurisdictions, if only 
because of the absence of pre-trial discovery and of the much shorter duration of trials.  As a 
consequence, lawyers charge much less for litigation, and arbitration appears as a much more 
sophisticated and expensive mode of dispute resolution. 
13 Cases going to ICC arbitration rarely involve less than $200,000.  See 19 INT’L CT. OF 
ARB. BULL. 13 (11.3% in 2007); 20 INT’L CT. OF ARB. BULL. 14 (7% in 2008); 21 INT’L CT. OF 
ARB. BULL. 14 (7% in 2009); 22 INT’L CT. OF ARB. BULL. 14 (6.8% in 2010); 23 INT’L CT. OF 
ARB. BULL. 14 (5.3% in 2011); 24 INT’L CT. OF ARB. BULL. 13 (5.8% in 2012).  Moreover, the 
value of the disputes between $200,000 and $1 million represent less than a fifth of the cases.  
See 19 INT’L CT. OF ARB. BULL. 13 (18% in 2007); 20 INT’L CT. OF ARB. BULL. 14 (20.7% in 
2008); 21 INT’L CT. OF ARB. BULL. 14 (16.4% in 2009); 22 INT’L CT. OF ARB. BULL. 14 
(17.9% in 2010); 23 INT’L CT. OF ARB. BULL. 14 (17.5% in 2011); 24 INT’L CT. OF ARB. BULL. 
13 (19.1% in 2012).  On the other hand, around half of the cases involve values between $1 
million and $30 million.  See 19 INT’L CT. OF ARB. BULL. 13 (46.6% in 2007); 20 INT’L CT. OF 
ARB. BULL. 14 (47.7% in 2008); 21 INT’L CT. OF ARB. BULL. 14 (50.5% in 2009); 22 INT’L CT. 
OF ARB. BULL. 14 (50.5% in 2010); 23 INT’L CT. OF ARB. BULL. 14 (50.9% in 2011); 24 INT’L 
CT. OF ARB. BULL. 13 (50.3% in 2012). 
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Furthermore, parties have far greater freedom to choose their 
preferred contract law in the context of international arbitration than 
in litigation before national courts.  This is because the vast majority 
of national arbitration laws recognize the parties’ unlimited freedom 
to choose the applicable law,14 while courts will sometimes only 
enforce the parties’ choice of law if the clause calls for the 
application of a law connected to the dispute.15  Moreover, national 
judges are almost invariably lawyers trained in a single legal system.  
Sophisticated parties might thus be reluctant to ask a national court to 
apply any law other than its own, since asking a national judge to 
apply a foreign law would not only be costly, but could easily result 
in errors and misinterpretations as to that foreign law’s content.  In 
contrast, members of arbitral tribunals do not typically come from a 
single legal background.  Moreover, the parties can freely choose the 
tribunal members after a particular dispute arises, allowing them to 
take the specific dispute and the applicable law into account when 
making that choice and to appoint arbitrators familiar with the 
applicable law.  This freedom to choose arbitrators based on their 
background and expertise allows commercial actors to, at the time of 
formation, ignore questions about the quality and skill of the 
adjudicator. 
 
2.  Types of Contracts and Geographical Origin of the 
Parties 
 
Another aspect of the ICC arbitration statistics that may raise 
questions about the sample’s representativeness could be that the 
data only involves certain types of contracts, or only parties from 
certain parts of the world.  But the industries involved in the statistics 
are remarkably varied.  Construction and engineering disputes are the 
most numerous, accounting for more than 15% of the cases.16  
Energy disputes account for about 10% of the cases.17  The 
 
14 See, e.g., UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration art. 28 (1985). 
15 This has long been the general rule in the United States.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(a) (1971).  The only exception is that a number of states have 
derogated to the Restatement for choices of forum law under certain conditions.  See infra note 42. 
16 See 19 INT’L CT. OF ARB. BULL. 12 (14.3% in 2007); 20 INT’L CT. OF ARB. BULL. 13 
(over 15% in 2008); 21 INT’L CT. OF ARB. BULL. 14 (15% in 2009); 22 INT’L CT. OF ARB. 
BULL. 14 (almost 17% in 2010); 23 INT’L CT. OF ARB. BULL. 14 (18.5% in 2011); 24 INT’L CT. 
OF ARB. BULL. 13 (17% in 2012). 
17 See 19 INT’L CT. OF ARB. BULL. 12 (10.8% in 2007); 20 INT’L CT. OF ARB. BULL. 13 
(10.4% in 2008); 21 INT’L CT. OF ARB. BULL. 14 (almost 10% in 2009); 22 INT’L CT. OF ARB. 
BULL. 14 (almost 13% in 2010); 23 INT’L CT. OF ARB. BULL. 14 (12.5% in 2011); 24 INT’L CT. 
OF ARB. BULL. 13 (15% in 2012). 
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remaining 75% of the disputes involve a variety of other sectors, 
with arbitrations addressing disputes in telecommunication and 
information technology,18 finance and insurance,19 transport,20 
general trade and distribution,21 and industrial equipment.22 
The origins of parties to ICC arbitrations are also remarkably 
diverse.  In fact, more than 120 nationalities are represented.23  The ICC 
is a truly international organization.  Nevertheless, the proportion of 
certain nationalities participating in ICC arbitrations suggests that 
some are overrepresented in the sample.  Although, the United States 
has been the most represented nationality over the last ten years, it 
seems that European parties are overrepresented in ICC arbitrations.  
They consistently represent more than half of the parties,24 while 
Asia (and Pacific) and the Americas typically contribute only 20% of 
all parties each,25 and Africa 6%.26  Europe’s share in world trade, 
however, has long been less than 50%; its share is around 40% for 
 
18 See 19 INT’L CT. OF ARB. BULL. 12 (10.2% in 2007); 20 INT’L CT. OF ARB. BULL. 13 
(8.1% in 2008); 21 INT’L CT. OF ARB. BULL. 14 (7.7% in 2009); 22 INT’L CT. OF ARB. BULL. 
14 (8.2% in 2010); 23 INT’L CT. OF ARB. BULL. 14 (9% in 2011); 24 INT’L CT. OF ARB. BULL. 
13 (8% in 2012). 
19 See 20 INT’L CT. OF ARB. BULL. 13 (7.2% in 2008); 21 INT’L CT. OF ARB. BULL. 14 
(almost 10% in 2009); 22 INT’L CT. OF ARB. BULL. 14 (9.1% in 2010); 24 INT’L CT. OF ARB. 
BULL. 13 (8% in 2012). 
20 See 20 INT’L CT. OF ARB. BULL. 13 (6.8% in 2008); 21 INT’L CT. OF ARB. BULL. 14 (6% 
in 2009); 22 INT’L CT. OF ARB. BULL. 14 (7.1% in 2010). 
21 See 20 INT’L CT. OF ARB. BULL. 13 (6.5% in 2008); 21 INT’L CT. OF ARB. BULL. 14 
(5.6% in 2009); 24 INT’L CT. OF ARB. BULL. 13 (6% in 2012). 
22 See 20 INT’L CT. OF ARB. BULL. 13 (6.2% in 2008); 21 INT’L CT. OF ARB. BULL. 14 
(5.3% in 2009); 24 INT’L CT. OF ARB. BULL. 13 (6% in 2012). 
23 The ICC reports that parties came from 125 countries in 2006, 126 countries in 2007, 
120 countries in 2008, and 128 countries in 2009.  Statistics, INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, 
http://www.iccwbo.org/Products-and-Services/Arbitration-and-ADR/Arbitration/Introduction-
to-ICC-Arbitration/Statistics/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2014). 
24 See 19 INT’L CT. OF ARB. BULL. 7 (55.3% in 2007); 20 INT’L CT. OF ARB. BULL. 8 (53% 
in 2008); 21 INT’L CT. OF ARB. BULL. 6 (53% in 2009); 22 INT’L CT. OF ARB. BULL. 7–9 
(50.3% in 2010); 23 INT’L CT. OF ARB. BULL. 7 (52.2% in 2011); 24 INT’L CT. OF ARB. BULL. 
7 (48.9% in 2012). 
25 See 19 INT’L CT. OF ARB. BULL. 6–7 (in 2007, 22.1% for the Americas and 19.1% for 
Asia and the Pacific); 20 INT’L CT. OF ARB. BULL. 6–7 (in 2008, 22% for the Americas and 
20% for Asia and the Pacific); 21 INT’L CT. OF ARB. BULL. 6 (in 2009, 21% for the Americas 
and 20% for Asia and the Pacific); 22 INT’L CT. OF ARB. BULL. 8 (in 2010, 23.7% for the 
Americas and 19.8% for Asia and the Pacific); 23 INT’L CT. OF ARB. BULL. 7 (in 2011, 19% for 
the Americas and 21% for Asia and the Pacific); 24 INT’L CT. OF ARB. BULL. 7 (in 2012, 
22.2% for the Americas and 22.7% for Asia and the Pacific). 
26 See 19 INT’L CT. OF ARB. BULL. 7 (3.5% in 2007); 20 INT’L CT. OF ARB. BULL. 6 (6% in 
2008); 21 INT’L CT. OF ARB. BULL. 6 (6% in 2009); 22 INT’L CT. OF ARB. BULL. 7–9 (6.2% in 
2010); 23 INT’L CT. OF ARB. BULL. 7 (7.8% in 2011); 24 INT’L CT. OF ARB. BULL. 7 (6.2% in 
2012). 
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services, and only slightly above 30% for goods.27  Such figures, of 
course, are not exactly comparable: the ICC reports on single 
disputes, while world trade is calculated in value.  Yet, as it would be 
impossible to know, much less consider, all international commercial 
contracts concluded in a given year around the world, comparing the 
relative proportion of nationalities in world trade seems to be a 
logical and reasonable method to get a sense of whether the ICC data 
is or is not representative.  From a geographical perspective, based 
on the origin of the parties, the comparison suggests that the data 
sample is not.  European parties are likely to be overrepresented 
while American and Asian parties underrepresented. 
This lack of representativeness, however, does not negatively 
impact this study.  The purpose of my Article is to assess the 
international attractiveness of different contract laws.  As I will 
explain in more detail below, I contend that such attractiveness can 
be determined by looking at situations in which parties to an 
international transaction deliberately choose a third-state law.  If 
Europeans are, in fact, overrepresented in the data, this suggests only 
that the study is more representative of their preferences than, say, 
the preferences of American or Japanese parties.  But this does not 
mean that American or Japanese contract laws are disadvantaged in 
any way in the study.  Rather, if there are fewer American parties in 
the sample, the consequence is only that there are more cases where 
neither party is American.  As a result, the parties could choose 
American law as a law applicable to their contract.  If there is a bias 
in the data, then it is against the laws of European states, and in favor 
of U.S. State laws. 
 
B.  An Empirical Analysis of the Choice of National Law 
 
1.  The Hypothesis 
 
Two data points are essential for assessing the international 
attractiveness of different contract laws.  The first data point is the 
law that parties choose to govern their contracts.  International 
contracts are typically concluded by parties based in different 
jurisdictions.  Each typically knows the laws of his particular 
jurisdiction, but does not know those of other jurisdictions, including 
 
27 See Reports, UNCTADstat, http://unctadstat.unctad.org/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx 
(last visited Apr. 19, 2014) (between 2007 and 2012, the share of Europe in world trade 
decreased from 50% to 45% for export of services, from 46% to 40% for import of services, 
from 40.38% to 33.67% for exports of goods, and from 40.58% to 33.14% for import of 
goods). 
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the law of the other party.  Accordingly, parties often prefer to 
submit their contract to their law—both because they would not incur 
the additional costs associated with learning a foreign law and 
because it is psychologically more comfortable to know that a law 
that they are familiar with is being applied.28  However, it is not 
always possible to satisfy parties from different jurisdictions in 
international contracts.  Rather, the parties must settle on one of two 
solutions.  The first is to choose the law of one party.  When they do 
this, it can be for reasons unrelated to the quality of the chosen law.  
For example, one party may have greater bargaining power and, 
because of this, be able to impose his own law.  The parties may also 
choose one party’s law simply to save the costs of learning of a 
foreign law for at least one of them.29 
In the alternative, the second solution is to choose a third-state 
law.  Despite the fact that both parties must incur the cost of learning 
a foreign law when this option is followed, conventional wisdom 
suggests that parties select this option when they are unable to agree 
on either of their own laws, and that this solution is the only way to 
resolve an otherwise intractable issue.30  Conventional wisdom 
suggests that the reason for choosing the third-state is purely 
negative: neither party wants the law of the other to apply.  However, 
once that negative decision is made, the choice of which third-state 
law becomes a positive choice: the parties have to agree on a third-
state law, which is attractive to both of them.  Efficiency-minded 
parties may choose a highly attractive foreign law if they believe that 
it brings them benefits which outweigh the costs of learning that 
foreign law.  One such benefit could be that the third-state law would 
be perceived as superior to the national law of either party.  
Therefore, I propose that the attractiveness of a given contract law 
can be assessed by determining the number of cases in which it was 
chosen as the third-state law.  In that regard, the ICC has been 
collecting and publishing useful data on the nationalities of ICC 
arbitrations parties and the law chosen to govern their particular 
contracts.  This data can be used to determine the extent to which 
these arbitration parties chose third-state law.  Arguably, it might 
have been more interesting to compare the laws chosen by parties 
against their actual places of business, but such information is harder 
 
28 See, e.g., Stefan Vogenauer, Regulatory Competition Through Choice of Contract Law 
and Choice of Forum in Europe: Theory and Evidence, 21 EUR. REV. PRIVATE L. 23 (2013); 
Gary Low, A Psychology of Choice of Laws, 24 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 363, 374 (2013). 
29 Obviously, any cost savings could then be shared between the two parties and would not, 
therefore, only benefit the party who does not actually incur them. 
30 See, e.g., Vogenauer, supra note 28, at 24. 
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to collect because the ICC does not collect or publish their arbitration 
parties’ places of business.  Nevertheless, I submit that commercial 
parties typically operate from the jurisdiction of their nationality, 
making nationality a sufficient proxy for place of business. 
The only significant exception may be companies incorporated 
in jurisdictions that are known to be offshore financial centers.  
Although such companies appear in ICC reports as nationals of those 
financial centers, their management will often be operating in 
another jurisdiction and will, thus, almost certainly be familiar with 
the law of that other jurisdiction.  Anecdotal evidence confirms this 
perception.  For example, take an ICC case disputing Brazilian 
shareholders’ rights: the agreement was governed by Brazilian law, 
and all parties were Brazilian, with the sole exception being a 
Luxembourg company which, in all likelihood, was a tax vehicle 
controlled by Brazilian actors.31 
However, while many companies incorporated in offshore 
financial centers are managed from other jurisdictions, others might 
not be.  Some jurisdictions known as offshore financial centers also 
have other industries.  This is the case in places like Singapore, 
Switzerland, and Luxembourg.  Companies incorporated in these 
jurisdictions could therefore actually be based and managed from 
there.  Even in jurisdictions such as the British Virgin Islands or the 
Cayman Islands, tourism often accounts for a significant part of the 
GDP.32  Therefore, it cannot be excluded that some disputes handled 
by the ICC concern transactions related to this business, for instance 
construction disputes.  While recognizing the potential impact on my 
study of actors incorporated in offshore financial centers,33 I decide 
to ignore the issue. 
 
2.  Available Data and Methodology 
 
To assess whether parties to international contracts choose one 
of their own laws or a third-state law, data must be compared on both 
 
31 Award of 2006, 23/1 ICC BULL. 77 (2012). 
32 It is considered, for instance, that 45% of the national income of the British Virgin 
Islands is generated by tourism.  See The World Factbook: British Virgin Islands, CENT. 
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/vi.html 
(last visited Apr. 22, 2014). 
33 For instance, eight of the most represented countries considered tax havens in ICC 
reports have been the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, Bermuda, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Panama, the Channel Islands, Cyprus, and Luxembourg.  They contributed 69 parties 
in 2007 (4.2%), 56 in 2008 (3.1%), 120 in 2009 (5.7%), 125 in 2010 (5.8%), 115 parties in 
2011 (5%), and 123 parties in 2012 (6%). 
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the nationalities of parties to international contracts and their ultimate 
choice of law. 
For more than ten years, the ICC has published reports 
specifically identifying the nationalities of ICC arbitration parties.  
Unfortunately, the ICC only started identifying the contract law 
chosen by parties in 2007.34  Thus, precise data for both nationality 
and the chosen law are only available for the period 2007-2012.  This 
six-year period constitutes the data used in this study. 
 
a.  Choice of Law Clauses 
 
Since it began publishing choice of law clause information in 
2007, the ICC has provided the percentage of cases in which the 
parties selected one of the top ten bodies of national law in a given 
year.  Swiss and English contract laws were consistently preferred; 
they were each typically chosen in more than ten percent of the 
reported cases. 
However, not all international contracts coming before an ICC 
arbitration panel contain a choice of law provision.  In that regard, 
the ICC has also annually published the percentage of those contracts 
that are either silent with respect to a choice of law or choose to 
apply non-national law.  Over the last five years, and indeed over the 
last ten years, this percentage has not varied by much, and has 
remained around 20%.  These contracts are irrelevant for our 
purposes; however, because we only consider contracts that choose 
to apply a national law.  Moreover, the existence of contracts without 
choice of law clauses does not affect the accuracy of the figures 
reported by the ICC on those contracts that contain choice of law 
provisions, but it complicates data confrontation with the data on the 
parties’ nationalities.  The ICC provides party nationality for all ICC 
arbitrations without distinguishing between cases in which parties 
stipulated the law applicable to their contract and those in which they 
did not. That is, the two data points do not have the same base.  To 
address this issue, I assume there is no significant variation between 
nationalities with respect to the probability of including a choice of 
law provision in their international contracts, and weight all data on 
nationalities accordingly and identically for each given year.35  An 
example is given in Table 1 for U.S. parties. 
 
34 Prior to 2007, the ICC would only rank the laws chosen by the parties, reporting which 
national law was most chosen, then which one came second, etc. 
35 For each given year, therefore, I reduce the share of all nationalities by the same figure, 
which corresponds to the number of cases that did not include a clause providing for the 
application of a national law. 
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TABLE 1. 
 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Number of U.S. 
parties 8.44% 10.35% 7.78% 8.67% 6.76% 7.12% 
Percentage of 
contracts including a 
choice of law 
provision 
.79 .84 .87 .82 .82 .85 
Weighted number U.S. 
of parties 6.67% 8.69% 6.77% 7.11% 5.54% 6.05% 
 
b.  Party Nationality in ICC Arbitrations 
 
The ICC has consistently reported the nationality of parties 
involved in ICC arbitrations for a long period, longer than it has 
reported on the inclusion of choice of law provisions.  Over the last 
ten years, U.S. parties have almost always been the most numerous.  
Between 2002 and 2008, they typically represented 10%–12% of all 
plaintiffs and defendants, although their relative share has recently 
declined, falling to a record low of just 6.76% in 2011.  During the 
same period, the next most represented nationalities were French and 
German parties, each representing 5%–8% of such parties, with the 
exception of 2011.  Surprisingly, and for the first time during the ten-
year period, Spanish parties were the second largest group in 2011 at 
6.28%.36 
For the purpose of this study, it is necessary to first assess the 
number of cases in which one of the parties had a given nationality.  
The goal is to compare this number with the number of cases in 
which the law of that nationality was stipulated as the governing law 
to determine whether parties of other nationalities considered that 
law appealing.  This comparison would be easy if all ICC arbitrations 
involved two parties of different nationalities, meaning that the 
percentage of parties of a given nationality would be equal to the 
number of cases involving a party of that nationality and, therefore, 
to the number of cases in which a party of that nationality negotiated 
the terms of an international contract, including its choice of law 
provision.  However, a number of ICC arbitrations do not correspond 
to this model. 
First, although disputes submitted to the ICC are typically 
 
36 France and Germany ranked, respectively, third and fourth. 
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international and, thus, involve parties of different nationalities, some 
do not.  Each year, some 16–19% of the total number of ICC 
arbitrations can be considered domestic cases (i.e., all parties of the 
same nationality).  These cases are not particularly interesting for 
determining parties’ preferences as far as choice of law is concerned, 
since it seems unlikely that parties sharing the same nationality 
would choose to apply any law other than the one common to both of 
them.37  Furthermore, these cases inflate the number of parties of a 
given nationality.  Fortunately, the ICC typically publishes the 
precise number of domestic cases for each of the most represented 
nationalities in ICC arbitrations.  It is thus possible to simply exclude 
them from the study.  In 2010, 2011, and 2012, there were no 
domestic cases involving any of the nationalities on which this study 
focuses.  On the other hand, in 2006, 2007, and 2008, the ICC 
reported the number of such cases involving French or German 
nationals.  Thus, for purposes of this study, I subtract them from the 
number of nationals involved in ICC arbitration in the relevant 
year.38 
Second, some ICC arbitrations involve more than two parties.  
Although the ICC publishes the percentage of these cases, it has not 
always been precise in its reporting.  For example, in 2011 it 
provided an exact percentage (31%), while in other years it only 
stated that “a third,” or “slightly less than a third” of the cases 
involved more than two parties.  Moreover, ICC publications do not 
specify the exact number of parties in multiparty arbitrations (e.g., 
three, four, or five parties).39  The only precise figures that the ICC 
always gives are the total number of international cases (be they two-
party or multi-party cases) and the total number of parties for a given 
year.  Assuming there is no significant variation between nationalities 
in this respect, one possible way to address the issue is to weight the 
data on party nationality by calculating the ratio of the number of 
cases divided by the total number of parties and then multiplying that 
ratio by two.  The result is the total amount of contracts in which at 
 
37 For anecdotal evidence confirming this hypothesis, see Award of 2011 in ICC Case No. 
10341, 22/1 ICC BULL. 50, 52–53 (2011), where two Belgian parties had provided for the 
application of Belgian law (seat of the arbitration: Switzerland), and Award of 2001 in ICC 
Case No. 10696, 15 ICC BULL. 94 (2004), where two Thai companies had provided for the 
application of Thai law (seat of the arbitration: Singapore). 
38 Finally, in 2009, the ICC report did not give any precise figures but indicated that 16% 
of the total number of cases were domestic (i.e., single nationality) cases, and that some 
involved U.S., German, or French parties. 
39 Until 2011, the ICC reported unevenly on multiparty arbitrations, but most often 
distinguished between cases involving more than two parties and cases involving more than 
five.  The 2012 Report is more precise. 
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least one party of a given nationality participated.  An example is 
given in Table 2 for U.S. parties. 
 
TABLE 2. 
 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Number of cases [a] 599 663 817 793 796 759 
Number of parties [b] 1611 1758 2095 2145 2293 2036 
Ratio [2(a/b)] .74 .75 .77 .73 .69 .74 
Number of US 
parties [c] 8.44% 10.35% 7.78% 8.67% 6.76% 7.12% 
Weighted number 
US of parties 
[(2(a/b)) x c] 
6.27% 7.81% 6.07% 6.41% 4.69% 5.30% 
 
Table 3 offers an example of final weighting of one nationality. 
 
TABLE 3. 
 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Number of cases [a] 599 663 817 793 796 759 
Number of parties [b] 1611 1758 2095 2145 2293 2036 
Ratio[2(a/b)] .74 .75 .77 .73 .69 .74 
Percentage of contracts 
including a choice of 
law clause [d] 
.79 .84 .87 .82 .82 .85 
U.S. single nationality 
cases [e] 0 0 16% 0 0 0 
Number of U.S. 
parties [c] 8.44% 10.35% 7.78% 8.67% 6.76% 7.12% 
Weighted number of 
U.S. parties [ (2(a/b) x 
d(c-e)] 
4.98% 6.56% 4.84% 5.25% 3.86% 4.51% 
 
The weighted number of parties shows the number of parties of 
a given nationality who were involved in cases where the contract 
was negotiated with a counterparty of a different nationality, and 
included a choice of law provision in their contract.  The two parties 
had two possibilities for that choice: they could either submit their 
contract to the law of one party, or to a third-state law.  The 
minimum number of parties who decided to submit their contract to a 
given third-state law is the difference between the number of clauses 
providing for the application of that law and the number of nationals 
of that third state who participated, to the negotiation of international 
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contracts (see, for example, Table 4).  This difference provides one 
way to measure the international attractiveness of the relevant 
contract law. 
 
TABLE 4. 
 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Weighted number U.S. 
of parties 4.98% 6.56% 4.84% 5.25% 3.86% 4.51% 
Number of choices of 
U.S. laws 7.1% 6.7% 7.1% 10.1% 10.6% 9.78% 
Int’l attractiveness of 
U.S. laws 2.12 0.14 2.25 4.85 6.74 5.26 
 
3.  Results 
 
This analysis of the data generates two sets of results.  First, it 
allows for an empirical measurement of the relative attractiveness 
of various contract laws.  The study shows that, for international 
contracts involving international parties, English and Swiss laws 
are on average three times more attractive than U.S. State laws and 
French law, and almost five times more attractive than German law. 
 
TABLE 5.  International Attractiveness Compared 
 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2007–2012 
(average) 
2007–2012 
(mean) 
English 
Law 9.37 10.98 11.91 11.00 8.50 15.43 11.20 10.99 
Swiss 
Law 8.77 7.62 11.06 10.16 10.28 11.59 9.91 10.22 
U.S. State 
Laws 2.12 0.14 2.25 4.85 6.74 5.26 3.56 3.55 
French 
Law 3.33 3.08 2.62 2.90 3.61 3.31 3.14 3.19 
German 
Law 1.78 0.08 1.72 3.71 3.66 1.24 2.03 1.75 
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Second, it measures how often parties to international transactions 
are willing to subject their contracts to a third-state law.  Over the last 
six years, the data reveals that at a minimum more than 20% of the 
parties were willing to do so, and that the actual percentage has 
hovered around 30% during the last four years (see Table 6).  These 
figures only take into account parties who opted for one of the five 
most popular contract laws.  Only incomplete data is available 
concerning Spanish and Brazilian laws (see Table 7).  Where 
available, these figures reveal that Spanish and Brazilian laws are 
rarely chosen as third-state laws to govern international transactions. 
 
TABLE 6.  Current International Market for Contracts 
 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2007–2012 
(average) 
UK 
Law 9.37 10.98 11.91 11.00 8.50 15.43 11.20 
Swiss 
Law 8.77 7.62 11.06 10.16 10.28 11.59 9.91 
U.S. 
Laws 2.12 0.14 2.25 4.85 6.74 5.26 3.56 
French 
Law 3.33 3.08 2.62 2.90 3.61 3.31 3.14 
German 
Law 1.78 0.08 1.72 3.71 3.66 1.24 2.03 
Total 25.37% 21.9% 29.56% 32.62% 32.79% 36.83% 29.85% 
2007
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TABLE 7.  International Attractiveness of Spanish and Brazilian 
Laws 
 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Spanish Law No data 0.72 No data 0.16 - 0.49 No data40 
Brazilian Law No data No data - 0.18 1.71 0.38 0.96 
 
 Therefore, it seems that more than 30% of parties to 
international contracts chose laws other than their own to govern 
them.  In a series of articles published in 2009, Geoffrey Miller and 
Theodore Eisenberg argued that there existed a market for large 
commercial contracts in the United States, and that New York 
actively competed in, and dominated, this market.41  Miller and 
Eisenberg based their argument on an empirical analysis of domestic 
contracts entered into by publicly held companies, which showed 
that New York state law was chosen in 45% of those contracts.42  
That parties to international transactions are willing to choose a 
third-state law for at least 30% of their contracts shows that a 
substantial international market for contracts also exists.  In fact, in 
recent years, several national lawyer associations have made clear 
that they intend to compete in this market by convincing 
international commercial actors to choose the law of their particular 
 
40 Spanish law was not among the ten most popular laws in ICC arbitrations in 2012.  As 
the ninth and the tenth most popular laws (Indian and Romanian laws) were chosen in 1.96% of 
the cases, it can be inferred that Spanish law was chosen in even fewer cases.  Spanish law’s 
international attractiveness for 2012 was, therefore, negative (below -0.32%). 
41 Miller & Eisenberg, Market for Contracts, supra note 4, at 2073. 
42 Id. 
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jurisdiction.  For example, the English Law Society and the German 
Ministry of Justice have issued advertising brochures promoting their 
respective contract laws.43  Lawmakers have also sometimes made 
similar efforts, as for instance New York in 1984.44  The existence of 
an international market for contracts is indeed clear. 
 
III.  EXPLAINING THE INTERNATIONAL 
ATTRACTIVENESS OF CONTRACT LAWS 
 
The main conclusion to be drawn from my analysis is that 
English and Swiss laws are, on average, three times more attractive 
to commercial parties than any other laws.  Below, I seek to explain 
this finding.  Intuitively, one would think that with parties to 
international commercial transactions being typically sophisticated 
actors, the choice of English and Swiss laws should reveal that those 
laws afford rules which are better suited to the interests of 
international commercial actors.  While such rules might exist, there 
are also a number of factors other than the intrinsic qualities of 
specific contract laws, which could influence the choice of law in 
international contracts.  First, I consider what these extrinsic factors 
might be.  Then, I explore whether the intrinsic qualities of English 
and Swiss laws explain their international attractiveness. 
 
A.  Extrinsic Factors 
 
1.  Seat of the Arbitration 
 
An important factor potentially impacting the parties’ choice of 
law is the seat of the arbitration.  The main offices of the ICC are 
based in Paris, France.  However, this is not to say that arbitrations 
conducted under the aegis of the ICC are necessarily located in Paris.  
The parties may choose the seat of the arbitration, and most often do.  
The ICC reported in 2011 that parties to its arbitrations selected seats 
in 63 different countries.  The two countries that have been selected 
the most frequently, by far, over the last six years and, indeed the last 
decade, are France and Switzerland.  The United Kingdom, the 
 
43 See supra text accompanying notes 2–3, 99–103. 
44 N.Y. General Obligations Law § 5-1401; see also Miller & Eisenberg, Market for 
Contracts, supra note 4, at 2091.  The New York legislature, however, did not amend specific 
substantive rules of New York contract law, but only enabled parties to freely choose New 
York law in major transactions.  While some associations of lawyers have tried to lobby their 
legislature to amend their contract law, there is no evidence of any positive response and action 
by lawmakers.  See generally Vogenauer, supra note 28. 
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United States, and Germany follow. 
 
TABLE 8.  Preferred Seats of ICC Arbitration 
 
 
 
The seat of the arbitration does not directly influence the law 
applied by arbitrators to decide disputes on their merits.  Under 
most international arbitration laws, the real consequence of 
designating the seat of the arbitration is to determine the law 
applicable to the arbitration itself (lex arbitri)45 and the courts that 
will have jurisdiction to review the validity of the arbitral award.46  
Virtually all national arbitration laws provide that parties have the 
freedom to choose which law governs the substance of the dispute 
and, if such a choice has been made, which law should be applied 
by the arbitrators to resolve the dispute.47  As a result, parties often 
 
45 See, e.g., UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration art. 1(2) (1985). 
46 See, e.g., GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 2402 (2009). 
47 See, e.g., UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration art. 28 (1985). 
Seat Chosen by Parties  
(number of cases) 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2007–2012 
(average) 
Switzerland 82 77 109 79 88 115 91.6 
France 86 73 94 109 92 80 89 
United Kingdom 53 56 67 46 59 68 58 
U.S. 36 29 31 42 43 33 35.6 
Germany 21 35 37 24 39 18 29 
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select one jurisdiction as the seat of the arbitration while choosing 
the law of another jurisdiction to govern the contract or dispute.  
This makes perfect sense, as the rationales for choosing the 
arbitration’s seat and the law governing the contract is quite 
different.  On the one hand, the arbitration’s seat should be chosen 
to ensure that the applicable national arbitration law favors 
international commercial arbitration and its national courts adhere 
to such law.  For instance, local courts should stand ready, willing, 
and able to offer efficient and effective remedies to aid the 
arbitration should one party become recalcitrant.  On the other 
hand, the law governing the contract should be chosen because of 
the quality of its contract law. 
The arbitration’s seat has no direct impact on the nationality—
or background—of the arbitrators.  Under most national arbitration 
laws, the parties are free to appoint whomever they choose as an 
arbitrator; arbitrators need not be lawyers particularly lawyers 
trained in the law of the jurisdiction in which the arbitration is 
seated.  If a dispute under the contract containing an arbitration 
clause arises, the agreed upon seat of the arbitration will often have 
little significance when appointing the arbitrators.48 
Thus, at first blush, the seat of ICC arbitrations might appear 
irrelevant for the purposes of this Article, and that would indeed be 
true if arbitration provisions in international contracts were always 
negotiated by sophisticated lawyers capable of advising their clients 
on the subtleties of international commercial arbitration law.  
However, there is no reason to believe that this is the case.  I am 
convinced that many parties to international commercial 
transactions do not completely understand the intricacies of their 
contracts—many of which contain “boilerplate” clauses the parties 
perceive to be not worthy of negotiation—when negotiating in the 
 
48 It could be, however, that in certain circumstances, the chair of the arbitral tribunal will 
regularly be chosen among the practitioners of the seat of the arbitration.  Arbitral tribunals 
composed of three members are typically appointed in two stages.  The parties first appoint one 
arbitrator each.  As it is their only chance to directly influence the composition of the tribunal, 
parties often use this opportunity to appoint an arbitrator with a background close to theirs.  
See, e.g., NATHALIE VOSER & ELIANE FISCHER, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN SWITZERLAND: 
A HANDBOOK FOR PRACTITIONERS 58 (E. Geisinger & N. Voser eds., 2d ed. 2013).  The party 
appointed arbitrators are then meant to agree on the third arbitrator, who will chair the tribunal.  
In order to avoid any imbalance in the tribunal, the chair will be chosen among professionals 
with a background other than those of the parties.  Id.  If a neutral jurisdiction was chosen as 
the seat of the arbitration, looking for a local professional might then appear as logical and 
more efficient.  It could be, therefore, that chairs of international arbitral tribunals sitting in 
Switzerland would often be Swiss practitioners.  This, in turn, could appear as a guarantee to 
have a lawyer trained in Swiss law, including Swiss contract law, as a member of the tribunal. 
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absence of sophisticated counsel.  In particular, it is not at all clear 
that parties understand the distinction between the venue of the 
arbitration and the law applicable on the merits.49  Their confusion 
may be further reinforced by their prior exposure to litigation 
choice of law/choice of jurisdiction provisions (as opposed to 
alternative dispute resolution provisions).  Typical choice of 
law/jurisdiction provisions that contemplate litigation choose a 
local court linked to the law chosen to govern the contract, which 
makes perfect sense in that context—a local court is in the best 
position to apply its own jurisdiction’s law. 
As a consequence, it is likely that a fair number of parties 
simply choose to apply the substantive law of the jurisdiction 
mentioned as the seat of any contemplated arbitration in the 
contract’s arbitration clause.  Some arbitral tribunals have expressly 
recognized that parties might make this mistake.50  Anecdotal 
evidence confirms this suspicion.  Examples include ICC case no 
7673 (French and Finnish parties provided for arbitration in 
Switzerland and the application of Swiss law),51 ICC case no 12365 
(Norwegian and Belgian parties provided for arbitration in the 
Netherlands and the application of Dutch law),52 and ICC case no 
7754 (Polish and Singapore parties provided for arbitration in 
France and the application of French law).53 
If these assumptions are correct, the success of some 
jurisdictions as arbitration venues could explain the success of their 
contract laws.  The two most often used arbitration venues in 
Europe are France and Switzerland.  It could very well be that a 
number of parties provide for the application of Swiss and French 
substantive law because they selected these jurisdictions as the seat 
of the arbitration.  The proposition is appealing as it offers an 
explanation for the remarkable attractiveness of Swiss contract law.  
However, if success as an arbitration venue were an important 
 
49 See, e.g., JAN PAULSSON, NIGEL RAWDING, LUCY REED ET AL., THE FRESHFIELDS 
GUIDE TO ARBITRATION CLAUSES IN INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS 17 (2010) (“Some 
negotiators have the impression that by opting for arbitration in country X they have chosen the 
law of that country to govern the merits of any dispute.”). 
50 See, e.g., Award of 2000 in ICC Case No. 10228, 21/1 ICC BULL. 61, 62 (2010) (the 
parties may even have assumed, as London was the place, that English law would naturally be 
applied). 
51 6 ICC BULL. 56 (1995); see also Award of 2000 in ICC Case No. 9651, 12/2 ICC BULL. 
76, 80 (2001) (German and Indian parties choosing Swiss seat and Swiss law). 
52 Award of 2004, 21/1 ICC BULL. 82 (2010). 
53 11/2 ICC BULL. 46–47 (2000); see also ICC Case No. 6773, 6/1 ICC BULL. 66, 67–68 
(1995) (where Italian, Luxembourg, Belgian, and American parties provided for arbitration in 
France and the application of French law). 
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factor for the purpose of explaining the success of particular 
contract laws, the attractiveness of French contract law should be 
much higher.  Yet, despite the fact that France is designated as the 
arbitration seat more frequently than Switzerland, French contract 
law remains substantially less attractive than Swiss contract law, 
which is chosen three times more often. 
 
TABLE 9.  Attractiveness of Contract Laws and Seat of Arbitration 
Compared 
 
 Attractiveness of Law  
2007–2012 
Seat 
2007–2012 
England 11.20 58 
Switzerland 9.91 91.6 
U.S. 3.56 35.6 
France 3.14 89 
Germany 2.03 29 
 
Interestingly, the data for the period 2007 to 2012 reveals a 
correlation between the arbitration’s seat and the substantive law 
chosen by the parties for Switzerland, but not France. 
 
TABLE 10.  Choice of Law and Seat of Arbitration Compared 54 
 
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Switzerland Seat (%) 15.6 12.5 14.6 10.8 12.2 16.4 
 Law (%) 10.2 9.5 13.1 11.6 11.9 13.4 
France Seat (%) 16.4 11.9 12.6 15 12.8 11.4 
 Law (%) 6.7 7.3 7.2 6.6 7.2 7.2 
 
 
 
 
54 The data compared are the actual choices made by the parties.  The percentage of choice 
of the seat of the arbitration is therefore calculated by using only data on cases where the 
parties actually chose the seat only (as opposed to cases where, in the silence of the parties, the 
seat was determined by the ICC).  
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Therefore, it could be that Swiss contract law benefits from 
Switzerland’s leading position as an arbitration venue, while 
French contract law does not.  
The correlation between the choice of Switzerland as an 
arbitration venue and the choice of Swiss contract law is 
confirmed by data collected by the Swiss Chambers’ Arbitration 
Institution.  The ICC is not the only arbitral institution offering 
its services to parties wishing to arbitrate in Switzerland.  For 
decades, the chambers of commerce and industry of several 
Swiss cities have had their own arbitration institution.  In 2004, 
the chambers of commerce and industry of Basel, Bern, Geneva, 
Lausanne, Lugano, Neuchâtel, and Zurich decided to establish a 
single arbitral institution, the Swiss Chambers’ Arbitration 
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Institution.55 Between 2004 and 2012, 663 cases were submitted 
to this new Swiss institution.56  Most of them were international,57 
but the parties were overwhelmingly European.58  As could be 
expected, parties to these cases virtually always choose a Swiss 
city as the seat of the arbitration—between 2004 and 2012, they 
have in more than 95% of the cases.59  Since Swiss parties have 
only accounted for 22% of the parties to these cases over the 
same period, one might have expected choices of law to be much 
more varied.  They were barely so.  Swiss contract law was 
chosen in more than 72% of the cases.  No other law was chosen 
in more than 5% of the cases.  German law ranked second with 
5% of the choices.  “UK law” ranked third, with 3%.60 
Regardless of the actual impact of the success of 
Switzerland as an arbitration venue on the frequency with which 
Swiss law is chosen to govern international contracts, the 
attractiveness of Swiss contract law cannot be explained by this 
factor alone: even if the attractiveness of Swiss contract law was 
discounted by the success of Switzerland as an arbitration venue, 
Swiss law remains more attractive than U.S. or German contract 
law.  To discount the success of Switzerland as an arbitration 
venue, I calculate the ratio of the number of cases where either 
the US or Germany was chosen as an arbitration venue to the 
number of cases where Switzerland was chosen as an arbitration 
venue and then apply it to the attractiveness of Swiss contract 
law (Table 11). 
 
 
55 SWISS CHAMBERS’ ARBITRATION INST., https://www.swissarbitration.org/sa/en/ (last 
visited Apr. 23, 2014) 
56 ARBITRATION STATISTICS 2012, SWISS CHAMBERS’ ARBITRATION INST. (2012). 
57 In 2012, 75% of parties to arbitrations administered by the Swiss Chambers’ Arbitration 
Institution had their registered office or domicile outside of Switzerland.  See Newsletter—
1/2013, SWISS CHAMBERS’ ARBITRATION INST. (2013), https://www.swissarbitration.org/ 
sa/download/newsletter_2013_1.pdf.  Between 2004 and 2012, the figure was higher at 78%.  
See ARBITRATION STATISTICS 2012, supra note 56. 
58 Between 2004 and 2012, 22% of the parties came from Switzerland, 52% from Western 
Europe, and 6% from Eastern Europe and the former USSR.  Only 4% came from North 
American, and 10% from Asia and the Middle East.  See ARBITRATION STATISTICS 2012, 
supra note 56. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
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TABLE 11.  Attractiveness of Swiss Law After Discounting Success 
as Arbitration Venue 
 
 Attractiveness 
2007–2012 
Seat 
2007–2012 
Swiss Law (adjusted) 9.91/91.6 x 35.6 = 3.85 91.6 
U.S. State Laws 3.56 35.6 
Swiss Law (adjusted) 9.91/91.6 x 29 = 3.13 91.6 
German Law 2.03 29 
 
2.  Language 
 
Another important factor in the international success of various 
contract laws should be the language in which they are available.  
One can assume that international parties speak the language of their 
jurisdiction.  They will also typically speak at least one language that 
is used in international commerce, which is currently dominated by 
English.  Other languages might be widely used at a regional level, 
for instance French in Western Africa or Spanish in Latin America.  
If international transaction parties are to consider applying third-state 
law, then it is logical to assume they prefer laws available in a 
language they understand. 
Because English is currently the dominant language in 
international commerce, laws available in English should enjoy a 
clear advantage over laws written in other languages: English law 
and U.S. State laws should, therefore, benefit from the language in 
which they are written, and part of their success may be explained by 
their availability in English.  When English attorneys market their 
legal services abroad, the first argument that they put forward is that 
English law is in English, which is “one of the most widely spoken 
languages in the world.”61 
It would be tempting to argue that the lesser attractiveness of 
French and German laws can be explained by the fact that neither 
French nor German is used as widely as English.  This is clearly true 
for German, which is spoken by few people outside of central 
Europe, less so for French, which is spoken in many of its former 
colonies and remains the second language in international diplomacy.  
The success of Swiss law, however, suggests that the importance of 
language might be limited or that the impact of languages on the 
attractiveness of laws is a more complex phenomenon.  There are 
 
61 See, e.g., LAW SOC’Y OF ENGLAND & WALES, supra note 2, at 8. 
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three official languages in Switzerland: German, French, and Italian.  
As a consequence, Swiss law is available in three languages: all 
statutes, codes, and cases can be found in each of the three 
languages.  Treatises on Swiss law are also available in each 
language. 
Thus, Swiss law can be distinguished from Germany and France 
because its contract law is available in several languages, while it is 
only available in one in Germany and France.  Could that explain 
why language might have positively (or maybe less negatively) 
impacted the international attractiveness of Swiss law?  Swiss 
lawyers regularly make an argument of the availability of Swiss law 
in three different languages in support of their attempt to market their 
legal services to foreigners.62 
It is hard to believe, however, that the availability of any law in 
several languages could be a decisive factor for parties choosing the 
law to govern their contract.  One would expect international 
transaction parties to care whether the chosen law is available in a 
language that they understand.  However, if a given party does not 
understand any of the three languages in which a law is written, that 
party is in no better situation than if the law was written in a single, 
unknown language.  From that perspective, for Switzerland to benefit 
from its contract law being available in three languages, a significant 
number of parties potentially interested in applying Swiss law to 
their contracts would need to understand at least one of these three 
languages.  Two of Switzerland’s official languages—German and 
Italian—are spoken in a very limited number of countries in the 
world, making it hard to believe that the availability of Swiss law in 
these two languages makes a significant difference at a global level.  
Its third official language—French—is more widely spoken and thus, 
might be considered in a somewhat different category.  But, if the 
availability of Swiss law in French explained the success of Swiss 
contract law, it would appear logical that French contract law would 
benefit, too.  It does not.  As previously noted, the data suggests that 
Swiss contract law is three times more attractive than French contract 
law. 
A far more convincing hypothesis is that language is only of 
limited importance in determining the attractiveness of particular 
contract laws.  It could very well be that many parties to international 
transactions do not know the contract law they ultimately choose, as 
 
62 Matthias Scherer and Michael E. Schneider, An Analysis of International Construction 
Contracts: Switzerland, in FIDIC—AN ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL CONSTRUCTION 
CONTRACTS 313 (Knutson ed., 2005). 
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they have neither the time, nor the training, to read and understand 
statutes, cases or treatises; rather, they ask their lawyer to advise 
them as to which law to select (or negotiate for).  The issue of 
language remains, of course, but it does not concern the ability of the 
contract parties to actually read and understand the law in its original 
language; they only need to understand the lawyers they hire, who 
one assumes to be trained in the relevant legal systems.  Thus, all that 
matters is whether the lawyers are able to explain the content of the 
law in a language their client understands.  Since many Swiss 
lawyers speak English and are able to explain the content of Swiss 
law in English to their clients, the language in which Swiss contract 
law is drafted may be irrelevant. 
 
3.  Neutrality 
 
 One of the most common arguments made in favor of choosing 
Swiss law to govern international contracts is its alleged neutrality. 
Swiss practitioners invariably insist on it in their writings.63  The 
Swiss Arbitration Association’s Web site also states that “[m]any 
international contracts referring to arbitration in Switzerland are 
governed by Swiss substantive law, as a neutral law.”64  The 
proposition was even endorsed by arbitral tribunals. The arbitral 
tribunals explained that the application of Swiss law clauses are 
intended to ensure the application of a neutral law.65 
The argument of Swiss law’s neutrality, however, is quite 
puzzling.66  As pointed out by Christiana Fountoulakis,67 a professor 
of international business law at a Swiss university, the claim seems 
to be built on two misunderstandings. 
The first misunderstanding confounds political neutrality with 
the “neutrality” of a particular contract law.  Political neutrality is a 
concept of public international law that applies to states.  States that 
are neutral, willingly or not, do not take part in any war and remain 
 
63 See, e.g., Scherer & Schneider, supra note 62, at 313; Nadine Magaud, Die Vorteile der 
Anwendung schweizerischen Rechts bei verborgenen Mängeln im Recht der internationalen 
Warenkaufverträge, RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT 387, at 389 (1996); Marc 
Iynedjian, Gas Sale and Purchase Agreements Under Swiss Law, 30 ASA BULLETIN 746 (2012). 
64 Arbitration in Switzerland, ASA, http://www.arbitration-ch.org/pages/en/arbitration-in-
switzerland/index.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2012). 
65 See, e.g., ICC Arbitration Award No. 8482 of December 1996, available at 
http://cisgw3.law. pace.edu/cases/968482i1.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2012). 
66 Christiana Fountoulakis, The Parties’ Choice of ‘Neutral Law’ in International Sales 
Contracts, 7 EUROPEAN J.L. REFORM 303 (2005). 
67 Id. at 305. 
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neutral towards belligerents.  Switzerland has been a neutral state 
since 1815.  Switzerland’s neutrality as a state, however, has no 
impact on the content of its contract law, which belongs to private 
law.  Private law is not concerned with wars, but rather with disputes 
between private individuals.  Rules of private law create rights and 
obligations for such individuals.  Typically, a private law, such as 
contract law, establishes the duties and obligations owed by one 
party to another, as well as the rights one party has against another, 
in a particular type of situation.68  In other words, private law 
typically creates an obligor and an obligee and, thus, a potential 
winner and loser.  Rules of private law are not neutral and Swiss 
private law (e.g., its contract law) is no exception.69 
The second misconception confounds Switzerland’s neutrality 
as a dispute resolution venue with the neutrality of its contract law.70  
As mentioned above, Switzerland is a leading arbitration venue.  One 
reason commercial actors choose Geneva or Zürich as the seat for 
arbitration is that neither the Swiss courts, nor any other arm of the 
Swiss government, are likely to interfere in the arbitration 
proceedings.  Thus, locating an arbitration in Switzerland guarantees 
neutrality of dispute resolution (provided Swiss parties are not 
involved) as neither party enjoys a home-court advantage and neither 
can use political connections to have a local court or any other 
authority interfere with the proceeding.  That neutrality, however, 
has no impact whatsoever on the content of the law applied by the 
arbitrators.  Neutral arbitrators—applying private law rules—must 
still determine which party is the obligor and which party is the 
obligee in the particular circumstances and then determine whether 
or not all of the obligations have been fulfilled.  The distinction 
between the forum and the applicable law is often difficult to grasp 
for non-lawyers, however, which might explain why a number of 
international contracts include jurisdiction clauses, including 
arbitration clauses, but no choice of applicable law.71 
Notwithstanding those common misunderstandings, a claim that 
Swiss law is neutral could be understood in a more sophisticated 
manner.  Swiss lawyers regularly argue that Swiss law has borrowed 
from a variety of legal traditions.  For instance, they insist that the 
Swiss Code of Obligations integrates concepts from several legal 
 
68 Some rules of private law are different, empowering parties to conclude certain acts. 
69 See Fountoulakis, supra note 66, at 307 (giving examples of the operation of Swiss rules 
of sales law). 
70 Id. at 306. 
71 See supra text accompanying note 34 (discussing that this occurs in approximately 20% 
of cases submitted to ICC arbitration). 
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systems and is, thus, suitable for cross-cultural relations.72  Swiss law 
could, therefore, be presented as culturally neutral.  As its rules and 
concepts come from different traditions, one might argue that Swiss 
law always has aspects somewhat familiar to virtually any party, 
regardless of their background.  French or German parties might find 
familiar rules and concepts in Swiss law. 
Nevertheless, regardless of the accuracy of the claim that Swiss 
contract law might be culturally neutral, the argument that cultural 
neutrality is a decisive factor for parties to choose Swiss law is 
unconvincing.  One would think that sophisticated parties would 
carefully assess the content of a foreign law before deciding to 
subject their contract to it, to ensure that the rules of the relevant law 
are efficient and tailored to their needs.  In other words, sophisticated 
parties should only consider the content of the law governing their 
contract.  It is hard to see why the origin of its rules should matter at 
all.  Why would parties be happy to know that a given rule of the 
chosen law also exists in their jurisdiction, particularly if they find 
that rule inefficient or harmful?  Perhaps it is the underlying 
assumption—that is, that parties to international transactions are 
sophisticated— that is at issue.  Some such parties, perhaps many of 
them, do not want to incur the costs of verifying the content of a 
particular contract law before subjecting their contract to it.  For such 
parties, it is easier to understand why the purported “cultural 
neutrality” of Swiss law might be appealing.  In such cases, their 
goal may only be to assure themselves that the chosen law does not 
contain completely unfamiliar concepts, rather than a full 
understanding of that law’s intricacies. 
 
4.  Model Contracts 
 
The use of certain contract laws in widely used model 
contracts could contribute to these laws’ international success.  It 
could be expected that parties to such contracts would not amend 
them with respect to choice of law and thus endorse this clause as 
they endorse others.  This would increase the number of contracts 
governed by the relevant laws.  It is doubtful, however, that such 
choices should be regarded as revealing the international 
attractiveness of these laws.  It seems clear that parties resorting 
to model contracts do not review all clauses.  They simply endorse 
most of them, which should not, therefore, be considered positive 
choices. 
 
72 Scherer & Schneider, supra note 62, at 313. 
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It is difficult to say the extent to which the result of my study 
could be explained by the use of model contracts.  To answer this 
question would require investigating whether the industries 
represented in the ICC Data73 typically use model contracts, and 
whether one contract law in particular governs such contracts.  
One such example could be finance contracts, which accounts, 
together with insurance contracts, for slightly less than 10% of 
ICC cases.74  International financial contracts notoriously provide 
for the application of English or New York law.75  It can thus be 
expected that model contracts issued by the finance industry 
include a choice of law clause in favor of one or the other.  This is 
the case, for instance, of the Master Agreement of the 
International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA).76  The 
success of New York and English law, therefore, owes a little to 
this contractual practice. 
But there are also reasons to believe that the influence of 
model contracts on my study is limited.  The most important is 
that trade associations produce many model contracts.  These 
contracts often provide for the application of a particular contract 
law.  For example, the model contracts issued by both the Grain 
and Feed Trade Association and the Refined Sugar Association, 
which are widely used in each of these industries,77 provide for 
the application of English law.  However, these associations have 
also very often established their own dispute resolution center.  
This means that disputes arising out of such model contracts will 
typically not be resolved through ICC arbitration, but rather by 
the arbitration center of the relevant trade association.  As a 
consequence, none of these contracts and disputes should appear 
in, and thus impact, the ICC Data on which this study is based. 
Interestingly enough, the ICC also happens to be a producer 
of model contracts.  The most famous are certainly the 
International Commercial Terms (INCOTERMS), which are 
widely used throughout the world in international sales of goods.  
But the ICC has also issued many other model contracts for 
sales,78 commercial agency contracts,79 distributorship contracts,80 
 
73 See supra text accompanying notes 15–21. 
74 See supra note 19. 
75 See, e.g., Pascal Durand-Barthez, The “Governing Law” Clause: Legal and Economic 
Consequences of the Choice of Law in International Contracts, INT’L BUS. L.J. 505, 513 (2012). 
76 See ISDA Schedule to the 2002 Master Agreement, Part 4 (h), at 34. 
77 See, e.g., GAFTA Contract No. 64, General Contract for Grain in Bulk, art. 24 (2006). 
78 See, e.g., INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, THE ICC MODEL INTERNATIONAL SALE 
CONTRACT—MANUFACTURED GOODS INTENDED FOR RESALE (1997). 
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or intermediary contracts.81  Remarkably, however, these model 
contracts typically include a choice of law clause encouraging 
parties to provide for the application of non-national rules.  The 
most common clause offers an option to the parties.82  Alternative 
A is to adopt a clause providing for the application of (1) “the 
rules and principles of law generally recognized in international 
trade as applicable to international contracts”, (2) trade usages, 
and (3) the UNIDROIT Principles on International Commercial 
Contracts.83  Alternative B is to provide for the application of a 
national law of the parties’ choice.  However, the drafters warn 
potential users of the model contracts that they “were drafted 
under the assumption that [they] would not be governed by a 
specific national law (as stated in Alternative A of [the relevant 
article])”.84  Therefore, the ICC does not encourage parties to 
provide for the application of any particular national contract 
law.85 
In theory, some widely used model contracts could have a 
huge impact on parties’ choice with respect to the applicable law, 
and thus explain part of the ICC Data. I am not aware, however, 
of their existence. 
 
5.  Law Firms 
 
It is likely that many parties involve lawyers when 
negotiating international contracts.  When this is the case, law 
firms should play an important role in their client’s choices of 
law.  In an ideal world, the involvement of lawyers should only 
improve the information available to the parties hiring them, and 
allow them to choose the law best fitting their interest.  In certain 
circumstances, however, lawyers will be interested in the eventual 
choice of their clients, and so have incentives to influence it so 
that it conforms to their own interest.  The issue of choice of law 
 
79 INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, THE ICC MODEL COMMERCIAL AGENCY CONTRACT (2002). 
80 INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, THE ICC MODEL DISTRIBUTORSHIP CONTRACT (2002). 
81 See, e.g., INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, THE ICC MODEL OCCASIONAL INTERMEDIARY 
CONTRACT (2000). 
82 See, e.g., id. art. 13.1; INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 79, art. 24.1.A; INT’L 
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 80, art. 24.1.A. 
83 See, e.g., INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 79, art. 24.1.A; INT’L CHAMBER 
OF COMMERCE, supra note 80, art. 24.1.A. 
84 See, e.g., INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 79, art. 24.1.A; INT’L CHAMBER 
OF COMMERCE, supra note 80, art. 24.1.A. 
85 For an analysis of the rationale of such clauses, see Gilles Cuniberti, Three Theories of 
Lex Mercatoria, 52 COLUM J. TRANSNAT’L L. 428 (2014). 
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clauses in international contracts clearly raises such a conflict of 
interests.  Lawyers are typically trained in the law of one legal 
system, and thus admitted (and insured) to practice one law.  If 
their client eventually decides to provide for another law to 
govern her contract, only lawyers admitted to practice that other 
law will be able to advise her with respect to the particular 
transaction.  In most cases, this will mean that only those lawyers 
will be able to make profit out of the relevant transaction.  The 
result is that most lawyers have strong incentives to see their 
client provide for the law in which they are trained.86 
The situation will not be different in most global law firms.  
Lawyers losing future work to partners from other offices of the 
same firm will still be losing work, and gaining limited credit for 
bringing it to others.  Some firms have adopted sophisticated 
systems where lawyers bringing work to others are compensated 
for doing so.  Only meaningful compensation could cancel to 
some extent the incentives to make all possible efforts to keep the 
work for oneself. 
The ICC does not report on lawyers who participated in the 
drafting of the contracts from which it draws its statistics.  In any 
case, it is unclear how it could gather accurate information in this 
respect, as lawyers involved in the negotiation of contracts are 
typically not mentioned on them. 
Despite the absence of any data, both on the lawyers advising 
parties entering to international transactions and the proportion of 
parties negotiating such contracts without lawyers, there are 
reasons to believe that English and U.S. laws should benefit more 
than any other from the involvement of lawyers.  U.S. and English 
law firms have a notoriously wider international presence than 
law firms from any other jurisdictions.  Furthermore, they not 
only have offices in a number of foreign jurisdictions, but they 
actually often dominate their legal markets.  In many 
jurisdictions, the local offices of U.S. and English firms are 
perceived as the top practices for high-end legal services such as 
capital markets or corporate/mergers and acquisitions.87  In 
Germany, for instance, since U.S. and UK firms’ expansion began 
in the 1990s, international law firms have transformed the German 
 
86 Jürgen Basedow, Lex Mercatoria and the Private International Law of Contracts in 
Economic Perspective, in AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 67 
(2006); Vogenauer, supra note 28, at 24. 
87 D. Daniel Sokol, Globalization of Law Firms: A Survey of the Literature and a Research 
Agenda for Further Study, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 5, 9 (2007). 
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legal market and have become the legal elite.88  While most 
lawyers staffing these local offices of international firms will be 
trained and admitted to practice locally, some will be expatriates 
practicing solely U.S. or English law.  When their clients 
negotiate international contracts, their incentive will thus be to 
provide for the application of the laws of England or of a U.S. 
state.89 
 
6.  Colonial Empires 
 
A final factor in the international success of certain contract 
laws could be that a number of jurisdictions are former colonies of 
two European countries.  As such, their laws will often closely 
follow the laws of the country that once occupied them.  The law 
of the former colonial power will thus be at least familiar to any 
actor originating from one of these colonies.  So it could be 
predicted that those parties would view the law of the former 
colonial power as not truly foreign, and would thus be happy to 
provide for its application.  The idea was expressed by the arbitral 
tribunal sitting in ICC case 10228: “In considering the matter, I 
think it is perfectly possible that a Cypriot party, whose law 
closely has followed the law of England and a party from a British 
Colony would quite naturally wish to apply English law, 
especially as the other possibilities - French, Swiss and Ukrainian 
- would probably be quite unknown, but known to be different 
from the law they were used to.”90 
The two biggest colonial empires in recent history were the 
British and the French empires.  Part of their legacy has been that 
most of their former colonies have indeed closely followed their 
legal systems and laws.  Former British colonies not only became 
common law jurisdictions, but also still consider the Common 
Law as one single set of rules administered from different 
jurisdictions.91  Former French colonies have similarly followed 
the French model: they became civil law jurisdictions, adopted 
 
88 Id. at 11. 
89 Voigt, supra note 5, at 11. 
90 Award of 2000 in ICC Case No. 10228, 21 ICC BULL. 61 (2010). 
91 See, e.g., Waghorn v Waghorn (1942) 65 CLR 289, 297 (Austl.) (“But where a general 
proposition is involved the court should be careful to avoid introducing into Australian law a 
principle inconsistent with that which has been accepted in England.  The common law is 
administered in many jurisdictions, and unless each of them guards against needless 
divergences of decision its uniform development is imperiled.”  The United States is a 
notorious exception.) 
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French codes and, for many of them, have cited judgments from 
French highest courts as authoritative. 
The international attractiveness of both English and French 
laws could therefore owe a great deal to the fact that many 
countries in the world have laws, which were modeled on either 
English or French law.  Commercial actors from former English 
or French colonies could perceive the law of their former colonial 
power as not foreign to them, and could thus be more than happy 
to concede its application as a third law.  The attraction of the law 
of the former colonial should logically be strongest when both 
parties would originate from former colonies.92  But even if one of 
the parties only was from a former colony, the choice of the law 
of its former colonial power could still be more satisfactory for 
both parties than the law of origin of any of them.93 
During the timeframe of the study, parties originating from 
jurisdictions following the English model94 accounted for 11% to 
14% of the total number of parties to ICC arbitrations, while 
parties originating from jurisdictions following the French 
model95 accounted for 6% to 8% of the same parties.  After using 
the same formula set for calculating the international 
attractiveness of contract laws,96 one finds that the maximum 
impact of this factor on the international attractiveness of English 
and French laws could be as high as 7.6% for English law and 
4.3% for French law (Table 12). 
 
92 For anecdotal evidence, see Award of 2002 in Case No. 11315, 21 INT’L COMM. ARB. 
BULL. 69 (2010) (parties from the British Virgin Islands and Gibraltar, choice of English law 
and English seat of arbitration); Award of 2008 in Case No. 14269, 22 INT’L COMM. ARB. 
BULL. 91 (2011) (parties from Hong Kong and Singapore, choice of English law and Swiss 
seat of arbitration). 
93 See, e.g., Award of 1999 in Case No. 9594, 12 INT’L COMM. ARB. BULL. 73 (2001) 
(parties from Spain and India, choice of English law and English seat of arbitration). 
94 I have considered that the following jurisdictions follow the English model: Australia, 
Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Canada, Cayman 
Islands, the Channel Islands, Cyprus, Ghana, Gibraltar, Grenada, Hong Kong, India, Isle of 
Man, Ireland, Jamaica, Kenya, Liberia, Malta, New Zealand, Nigeria, Saint Kitts and Nevis, 
Saint Vincent and Grenadine, Singapore, Tanzania, Turks and Caicos Islands, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Uganda, and Zimbabwe.  I have not considered jurisdictions that were not involved in 
ICC arbitrations during the timeframe of the study. 
95 I have considered that the following jurisdictions follow the French model: Algeria, 
Belgium, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Comoros, Republic of Congo, Ivory Coast, 
Dominican Republic, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea, Haiti, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Mali, 
Madagascar, Mauritania, Morocco, Romania, Senegal, Togo, Tunisia, and Zambia.  I have not 
considered jurisdictions that were not involved in ICC arbitrations during the timeframe of the 
study. 
96 See supra text accompanying Table 3. 
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TABLE 12.  Jurisdictions Following English or French Law 
 
Jurisdiction  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2007–
2012 
- Following 
English law 
% of parties 
to ICC 
arbitrations 
10.92 11.32 13.99 14.78 9.38 13.26  
% weighted  6.41 7.17 9.49 8.96 5.34 8.40 7.63 
- Following 
French law 
% of parties 
to ICC 
arbitrations 
6.15 5.92 6.4 7.51 7.85 8.1  
% weighted  3.61 3.75 4.34 4.55 4.47 5.13 4.31 
 
The average international attractiveness of English and French 
contract laws between 2007 and 2012 was 11.2% and 3.14%, 
respectively.97  During the same period, parties familiar and 
comfortable with English or French law were involved in 
respectively 7.61% and 4.31% of the relevant cases and thus in the 
negotiation of the relevant contracts.  If all these parties had been 
able to convince their counterparty to provide for the law of their 
former colonial power, the legal background of these parties could 
explain two-thirds of the cases where non-English parties have 
chosen English law.  It is interesting to note that even if the legal 
background of parties had such a maximal impact, English law 
would still have remained attractive to parties with no familiarity 
with it in 3.59% of the cases, which would be comparable to the 
international attractiveness of U.S. state laws (3.56%) and higher 
than the attractiveness of any other law, Swiss law excepted. 
But there are a number of reasons to believe that the legal 
background of parties could not have such a high impact on choices 
of law.  First, it takes two parties to agree on any contractual clause.  
Parties familiar with either English or French law negotiate contracts 
with other parties who are not, and who thus have no incentive to 
accept a clause providing for the law of the former colonial power of 
the other party.  Indeed, if the goal of providing for a third law is to 
avoid granting any advantage to the other party, parties unfamiliar 
with a given contract law, be it English or French law, should refuse 
any clause providing for its application when dealing with parties 
with an English or a French background.  Second, while the law of 
 
97 See supra Table 5 and accompanying text. 
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some jurisdictions might once have been influenced by English or 
French law, it might have developed independently, to the extent that 
modern corporate lawyers might not feel comfortable anymore with 
the law of the former colonial power.98  This is obviously the case 
with U.S. parties, but it could also be the case of other jurisdictions, 
for instance Belgium with respect to France.99  Third, a number of 
the jurisdictions under consideration are tiny territories, often islands, 
in which companies incorporate for tax reasons.100  Their directors 
will typically have no other connection with these jurisdictions, and 
certainly no background in their laws. 
 
B.  Intrinsic Qualities of Contract Laws 
 
While exogenous factors may contribute to the international 
attractiveness of particular contract laws, the most important factor 
ought to be the quality of the contract law itself.  All other things 
being equal, international parties should prefer the law that best fits 
their needs.  Thus, one would expect the most attractive contract laws 
to be the best, at least from the perspective of the parties. 
The preferences of international commercial parties, therefore, 
might reveal which qualities they value and look for when choosing 
the law governing their contract.  The ICC data reveals that English 
and Swiss contract law are each selected three times more often than 
any other law.  Below, I consider whether this preference can be 
explained by certain particularities of those contract laws. 
 
1.  Marketing Materials 
 
I begin my inquiry with marketing materials offered by an 
English bar association and by individual Swiss commercial lawyers, 
as it seems obvious that such an organization and individuals would be 
in the best position to understand the qualities of their jurisdiction’s 
contract law and, with respect to individual practitioners, to frequently 
 
98 Similarly, parties with a strong bargaining power might prefer to impose their law rather 
than try to secure the application of their former colonial power’s law.  There is anecdotal 
evidence of the fact that Indian companies prefer Indian law.  See, e.g., Award of 1996, Case 
No. 8175, 15 INT’L COMM. ARB. BULL. 85 (2004) (Indian and Canadian parties, choice of 
Indian law and of France as the seat of the arbitration); see also Award of 2002 in Case No. 
11209, 16 ICC BULL. 102 (2005). 
99 See, e.g., Award No. 9301, 12 INT’L COMM. ARB. BULL. 140 (2001). 
100 This is especially true for former English colonies, which include the Bahamas, 
Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Channel Islands, Cyprus, 
Gibraltar, Grenada, Isle of Man, Malta, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and Grenadine, 
Turks and Caicos Islands, and Trinidad and Tobago. 
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advise clients negotiating international contracts.  Of course, 
opinions of practicing lawyers and bar associations should be used 
with caution: the existence of an international market for contracts 
means that lawyers engage in a worldwide competition to attract and 
retain clients.  Bar associations and practicing lawyers are, therefore, 
unlikely to portray the law of their jurisdiction in a negative light.  
However, while they might be tempted to hide some of the 
drawbacks and issues raised by the law of their jurisdiction, they 
have no reason to refrain from advertising its good qualities to attract 
business for their members.  Indeed, these associations might be 
accused of overemphasizing or magnifying the good aspects, while 
ignoring any negative ones.  But, it would be highly surprising if 
they were to fail to mention any good aspects of their law, 
particularly those qualities that they truly regard as essential to their 
target audience—international commercial actors.  Thus, the 
marketing materials published by the bar associations and practicing 
lawyers of leading jurisdictions in the international market for 
contracts should be useful for assessing the qualities of the laws 
which have made those laws so attractive. 
The Law Society of England and Wales issued an infamous 
brochure marketing England as the jurisdiction of choice for 
international transactions.101  The document attempts to show that 
English law is superior to civil law systems, suggesting that English 
practitioners believe that England competes with civil law 
jurisdictions in the international market.  The brochure asserts that 
English law is a better choice for several reasons.  First, English law 
is transparent and predictable, offering greater certainty than many 
civil law systems.102  Second, it is more flexible than civil law 
systems.103  Third, it better supports the needs of international 
commerce, as it can adapt more quickly than statute-based laws.104  
Finally, England has a fairly “light touch” regulatory system, which 
many companies prefer.105 
The Swiss bar, on the other hand, has not felt the need to issue a 
similar document.  However, many individual Swiss practitioners write 
on Swiss law in a variety of publications and they often offer 
explanations for the success of Swiss law.  Their most common 
argument is that Swiss law is perceived as “neutral.”  Another argument 
is that Swiss law is available in several languages.  But, one can search 
 
101 LAW SOC’Y OF ENGLAND & WALES, supra note 2. 
102 Id. at 7. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 8. 
105 Id. at 14. 
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high and low for references to the qualities of Swiss law that make it 
attractive to international commercial actors.  Swiss lawyers sometimes 
assert that the Swiss Code of Obligations is “concise” and “relatively 
easily accessible”—these statements appear to damn the Code with faint 
praise.106  Some also argue that there are fewer mandatory rules in Swiss 
law than in many other systems.107  Finally, some underscore that Swiss 
law is particularly well suited to certain types of commercial contracts, 
such as distribution agreements.108 
The arguments put forward by both the English and Swiss law 
advocates are surprisingly general.  The Law Society of England and 
Wales only asserts, for instance, that English law is more transparent, 
predictable, and flexible than others, while both English and Swiss 
laws allegedly contain fewer mandatory rules.  But neither the 
English nor the Swiss supporters point to any specific rules that make 
their particular contract law a better fit for international commercial 
actors.  Why is this? Could it be that no specific rules, or 
combination of specific rules, make English or Swiss law unique 
(meaning there is no reason in particular that can explain why 
English and Swiss law are chosen more often than any other law)?  
As noted, if such specific rules exist and can explain English and 
Swiss law dominance in the international market for contracts, one 
would expect English and Swiss practitioners to trumpet their 
existence and superiority from the highest ramparts when marketing 
their particular law to international commercial actors.  The fact that 
they do not suggests that they are either unable or unwilling to do so. 
One explanation may be that there simply are no specific rules 
that explain why international commercial actors choose English or 
Swiss law to govern their contracts so much more frequently than 
other laws.  English and Swiss practitioners would not regularly 
convince clients that they should choose English or Swiss laws 
because of the existence of certain specific rules of contract law.  
They might have tried to argue that some rules justified choosing 
their law but realized that their clients were not sensitive to such 
arguments.  They might never have tried, because they did not really 
see which specific rule to put forward.  In any case, choices of law 
would be made on other grounds. 
An alternative explanation may be that specific rules exist, but 
 
106 Scherer & Schneider, supra note 62, at 313. 
107 Christoph Wildhaber, Franchising—Switzerland: Pre-contractual Disclosure Obligations, 
INT’L LAW OFFICE (Nov. 14, 2006), http://www.internationallawoffice.com/newsletters/detail. 
aspx?g=a6405696-1070-db11-a275-001143e35d55. 
108 Sebastian Brachert & Andreas Dietzel, Deutsche AGB-Rechtsprechung und Flucht ins 
Schweizer Recht, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR DAS GESAMTE SCHULDRECHT 441 (2005). 
CUNIBERTI_FINAL_WORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/3/14 7:23 PM 
Northwestern Journal of 
International Law & Business                                                 34:455 (2014) 
 
496 
that English and Swiss law promoters are unwilling to rely on them 
in their marketing materials.  Such behavior might at first seem 
surprising, but can be explained.  First, one might believe that 
English and Swiss law supporters do not want to disclose the rules 
that make their “product” superior to others in an attempt to prevent 
competitors from closing the gap by improving their own.  A similar 
argument was made in the corporate charter competition among the 
different U.S. states.  Scholars argued that the state of Delaware 
consciously chose not to adopt precise corporate law rules in order to 
prevent its potential competitors from simply copying its rules.109  
Instead, those scholars argued, Delaware chose to rely on its highly 
skilled and well-respected Court of Chancery to adapt and clarify its 
corporate law rules, which was far more difficult for its competitors 
to emulate.110  The theory remains disputed in the United States,111 
and I am unaware of any evidence that a similar theory might apply 
in the context of the international market for contract law. 
Yet another theory for the English and Swiss law advocates’ 
lack of specificity is a desire to remain general because being too 
specific would be too costly.  In sophisticated jurisdictions like 
England, Switzerland, France, or Germany, particular types of 
commercial contracts are governed by rules tailored to the type of 
contract.  The quality of a chosen contract law, therefore, must be 
assessed on the basis of the distinctive rules governing that particular 
type of contract.  The issue is not, therefore, whether general English 
contract law is superior to general French contract law.  It is whether 
the English law governing financial contracts is superior to the 
French law governing financial contracts, or whether Swiss franchise 
law is superior to German franchise law.  The logical consequence 
would require national law promoters to not only present and praise 
that nation’s general contract law, but also to highlight and applaud 
the distinctive rules for each particular type of contract.112  Any such 
attempt would, of course, raise several issues.  First, the advertising 
 
109 See, e.g., Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate 
Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908, 1910 (1998). 
110 See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 
1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225, 276 (1985); Kamar, supra note 109, at 1925. 
111 Many scholars explain Delaware’s success by the precision of its highly developed case 
law.  See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of 
Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 484 (1987); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf 
Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering the Competition Over Corporate 
Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553, 554 (2002). 
112 Some practitioners do, in fact, argue that the law of their particular jurisdiction is 
specifically well suited to certain types of transactions.  See, e.g., Brachert & Dietzel, supra 
note 108 (arguing that Swiss law is well suited to distribution contracts). 
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campaign would be prohibitively expensive.  One can imagine that 
The Law Society of England and Wales might not have had the 
necessary resources to first survey the national rules governing all of 
the particular types of contracts and then determining which were 
more beneficial for international commercial actors than the rules of 
its competitors.  Rather, one can imagine an organization settling for 
a much cheaper alternative: issuing a brochure promoting, in highly 
general terms, the benefits of English law. 
Second, a particular body of national contract law might afford 
a distinctive, competitive legal regime for certain types of contracts, 
but not for others.  Practitioners specialized in transactions governed 
by a competitive legal regime might be happy to explain why such a 
regime is superior, and underscore the specific rules which make it 
so.  However, practitioners specializing in transactions governed by a 
less distinctive regime would not be able to market themselves as 
effectively and might therefore suffer from the publication of a 
brochure by their jurisdiction’s professional association which touts 
the benefits of laws governing only certain types of transactions 
while saying nothing about their specialty.  In such circumstances, 
avoiding specificity might satisfy a greater number of the association’s 
members. 
Third, it could be that English and Swiss law promoters target 
potential clients who may not be overly impressed by complex legal 
arguments based on the nuances of a particular contract law.  Rather, 
such promoters may consciously choose to target business decision 
makers, rather than lawyers from other jurisdictions or even in-house 
counsel looking for local counsel, who are not particularly interested 
in details which may or may not be relevant to their situations.113  
From that perspective, easily understood, general arguments could be 
considered more effective.114  Whether choice of law provisions are 
indeed negotiated by such business decision-makers (and whether the 
latter should be the target of such marketing efforts), however, 
remains to be seen. 
 
2.  General Features of Legal Systems 
 
For whatever reason, the promoters of English and Swiss law 
focus on general features of their respective contract laws when 
 
113 Vogenauer, supra note 28, at 33.  Some of the advice given by the Law Society’s 
brochure (i.e., to provide for the application of English law, to include a choice of law clause to 
that effect) confirms it. 
114 Id. 
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alleging their respective superiority.  I will first discuss their 
arguments and explain why I find them unconvincing.  I will then 
consider whether more specific arguments can be identified that 
better explain the attractiveness of these two contract laws. 
English law advocates, on one hand, make four basic assertions: 
(1) that English law offers greater legal certainty than civil law 
systems, (2) that it is more flexible, (3) that it is more adaptable to 
quickly address the needs of commerce, and (4) that it includes fewer 
mandatory rules.115  On the other hand, Swiss law promoters assert 
that Swiss law has fewer mandatory rules and is easily accessible.116 
At the outset, one must acknowledge that one of the oldest and 
most traditional endeavors of comparative law scholarship has been 
to compare the English common law and civil law systems.  Thus, a 
serious assessment of the Law Society of England and Wales’ 
assertions relating to the English law’s greater legal certainty and 
flexibility are far beyond the scope of this Article.  But a consensus 
among scholars suggests that such an assessment would not prove 
particularly useful: all legal scholars who have commented on the 
Law Society’s brochure have been highly critical of it,117 and some 
have even gone so far as to identify a number of its inaccuracies and 
misleading statements.118  Clearly, the brochure is a marketing tool 
that does not aim at contributing to legal science.  Its target is 
business people, perhaps because they, lacking legal sophistication 
could be more easily convinced by such arguments.  I will thus only 
briefly discuss the accuracy of the advertising claims made in the 
Law Society’s brochure. 
Any claim that English common law offers greater legal 
certainty than its civil law counterparts is built on the idea that a 
system of precedent produces more precise rules.  The English 
system of precedents certainly produces precise rules, because 
precedents are defined by reference to the ratio decidendi of cases, 
and thus to the facts of cases.  Civil law systems, however, can 
produce equally precise rules.  First, legislation can be very precise, 
as English statutes demonstrate.  Some French or German statutes are 
 
115 See supra text accompanying notes 101–04. 
116 See supra text accompanying notes 105–06. 
117 See Christian von Bar, Konkurrenz der Rechtsordnungen und “Law Made in 
Germany,” LIBER AMICORUM OLE LANDO 13 (M.J. Bonell, M.-L. Holle, P.A. Nielsen eds., 
2012); Hein Kötz, The Jurisdiction of Choice: England and Wales or Germany?, 18 EUR. R. 
PRIVATE L. 1243 (2010); Vogenauer, supra note 28, at 33; Volker Triebel, Der Kampf ums 
anwendbare Recht: Offener Brief eines Anwalts an die Bundesjustizministerin, in ANWALTSBLATT 
306 (2008). 
118 See, e.g., Triebel, supra note 117; Kötz, supra note 117. 
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equally precise.  Second, and more importantly, precision in civil law 
systems comes from a feature of the civil law tradition foreign to the 
English common law: abstraction.  Civil law systems are not just a 
collection of rules.  Instead, they aspire to attain a system of coherent 
wholes in which particular rules can be deduced from general 
principles.  Civil law systems are the result of centuries of attempts 
to systematize and organize the law in a logical, hierarchical way.  
The consequence is that lawmakers, whether legislatures or courts, 
can refer to highly abstract concepts developed by scholars over the 
years.  In light of this conceptual background, civil law rules can be 
short and use seemingly vague words that are actually very precise 
terms of art.  Observers unaware of this particularity of the civil law 
tradition might easily conclude that civil law systems produce less 
precise rules than the common law tradition.  They would be wrong.  
The claim that the English common law is more precise than its civil 
law counterparts reveals, at best, ignorance of how civil law systems 
work and, at worst, a purposeful attempt to mislead business actors. 
The brochure’s claims that the English common law is more 
flexible than civil law systems and that it has a “light touch 
regulatory system” (as opposed to the implicit “heavy touch” used in 
civil law systems) essentially express the same idea: English 
common law contains more default rules, and fewer mandatory rules, 
than civil law.  As a consequence, the brochure suggests, parties to 
commercial transactions have more freedom to agree on contractual 
provisions when English law governs the contract.  However, there is 
simply no empirical basis for such a claim.  To begin with, Swiss 
lawyers make exactly the same claim with respect to Swiss law, 
which belongs to the civil law tradition.119  And indeed, commercial 
contract law in civil law jurisdictions is essentially composed of 
default rules that can be varied by contract, just as they can under the 
English law.120  In the words of legendary comparative law scholar 
Hein Kötz, “some common [law] lawyers still seem to think that the 
German or French code provisions on contract law lay down a rigid 
and unbendable set of mandatory rules and thereby severely limit the 
parties’ freedom of action.  This is misleading, to put it mildly.”121 
The last claim—that English law adapts more quickly than civil 
law and is, therefore, more supportive of the needs of international 
commerce—is equally inaccurate.  It builds, once again, on a 
simplistic view of the civil law tradition, which is perceived as a 
 
119 See Wildhaber, supra note 107. 
120 See Kötz, supra note 117, at 1246. 
121 Id. 
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legal system relying exclusively on codes.  The alleged English 
advantage would therefore come from the fact that judges make the 
law, and can adapt it each time they are confronted with a new 
commercial practice.  The reasoning is flawed in many ways.  First, 
judges also make the law in civil law jurisdictions.  In France, for 
instance, before European harmonization, judges made most of tort 
law122 and the entire conflict of laws.  Not only did France’s highest 
courts engage in lawmaking in the absence of legislative 
intervention,123 but they also rewrote sections of the Civil Code when 
they found it outdated, or simply inappropriate.124  France’s highest 
courts adapted French law as much and as often as they wanted.  
Ironically, it is unclear whether the same could be said of England’s 
highest courts.  England’s highest courts may not freely overrule 
their own precedents.  The United Kingdom Supreme Court may 
only do so under certain limited conditions, which do not include the 
mere inappropriateness of an old precedent.125  The Court of Appeal 
of England and Wales has simply no power to do so.126  When one 
knows that, in practical terms, many cases must end at the level of 
the Court of Appeal, one can legitimately wonder whether English 
judges have the power to adapt the Common law to any new need 
facing society. 
To conclude, it is highly doubtful that the general features of the 
English law described in the Law Society’s brochure or of Swiss law 
described by Swiss practitioners can explain why those two contract 
laws are so often chosen by parties to international transactions. 
 
 
122 See, e.g., FRANÇOIS TERRÉ, PHILIPPE SIMLER & YVES LEQUETTE, DROIT CIVIL—LES 
OBLIGATIONS 15 (9th ed. 2005). 
123 For instance, the French Parliament almost never legislated in private international law, 
which was thus entirely made by the French Supreme Court for private and criminal matters.  See, 
e.g., DOMINIQUE BUREAU & HORATIA MUIR WATT, DROIT INT’L PRIVÉ 36 (2d ed. 2010) (Fr.). 
124 The vast majority of the Civil Code sections on the law of obligations date back to 
1804.  Many were reinterpreted in ways amounting to redrafting in recent years.  For instance, 
Article 1184 of the Civil Code provides that the termination for breach of contracts must be 
judicial.  The Cour de cassation has held that the other party could also declare termination.  
See Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., Feb. 20, 2001, Case 
No. 99-15170 (Fr.). 
125 Practice Statement, [1966] 1 W.L.R. 1234. 
126 Davis v. Johnson, [1979] A.C. 317 (H.L.). 
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3.  Exploring Some Particularities of English and Swiss 
Contract Laws 
 
For a yet-to-be-determined reason, Swiss and English law 
promoters have decided, for the most part, to advocate the use of 
their respective contract laws by emphasizing their own, perhaps 
skewed, perception of the general features of their legal system rather 
than specific contract law rules.  Regardless of their particular 
marketing strategies, it could well be that such specific rules exist 
and that sophisticated commercial parties know about them and 
purposely choose to apply Swiss or English law to take advantage 
thereof.  Below, I reflect on what such specific rules might be. 
One obvious reason to prefer one law over another is the 
existence of mandatory rules prohibiting certain types of contract 
clauses or even certain types of transactions altogether.  Commercial 
parties can be expected to avoid contract laws that contain such 
restrictions, and prefer more liberal ones.  It could be, therefore, that 
some types of transactions or particular contract terms are authorized 
under English or Swiss law, while forbidden under many other laws.  
As noted, this is certainly the general claim made by some promoters 
of these two contract laws.127  Are there, however, specific examples 
and, at a minimum, anecdotal evidence that this is the case? 
As a preliminary point, I am only discussing mandatory contract 
rules.  Many other regulatory regimes are irrelevant for our purposes 
because their territorial scope of application is left untouched by 
choice of law clauses.  Competition law, for example, regulates 
transactions without regard to which contract law is chosen by the 
parties to govern their contract. 
As noted, despite the general claims made by their advocates, it 
is unclear whether either English or Swiss contract law is 
significantly more liberal than the commercial laws of other liberal 
states.128  There is no doubt, however, that the English legal system 
has developed very differently from civil law systems and that this 
divergence has resulted in certain particularities that have generated 
unique legal doctrines.  One example is the English law’s distinction 
between law and equity, which generated distinctive common law 
doctrines and mechanisms, such as that of a trust.  Such doctrines 
allow English practitioners to structure commercial transactions in 
ways that were not only unknown to the civil law tradition, but that 
are also very hard to replicate thereunder.  In financial law, the trust 
 
127 See supra notes 119–21 and accompanying text. 
128 See supra notes 119–21 and accompanying text. 
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doctrine enables English lawyers to establish security trustees who 
hold and manage, in trust, securities for a syndicate of creditors.  The 
law of many civil law jurisdictions simply does not allow the 
appointment of a trustee with the same powers and with the same 
results.129  One can understand, therefore, why parties to such 
transactions choose English law to govern them.  To compete with 
the English law, some civil law jurisdictions have tried to reform 
their law of secured transactions to offer an equivalent to the trust,130 
but the results have not always been satisfactory.131 
There may be other types of transactions for which English law 
is uniquely suited; choice of English law, therefore, could be 
explained by its specific rules and doctrines in certain cases.  There is 
no evidence, however, that this is actually the case for a large 
number of transactions.  Some practitioners have reported that this is 
not the case for construction, sales, or mergers and acquisition 
contracts.132  It is thus unlikely that the dominance of English law is 
explained on that basis alone.133 
Once parties to commercial transactions have determined that 
their contract will be found valid and enforceable in the competent 
jurisdiction, their next concern is likely performance thereunder.  
Thus, the rules applicable to the interpretation and performance of 
commercial contracts should be of critical importance to them.  
When parties conclude a commercial contract, one might further 
expect parties to agree on a law that will strictly enforce the specific 
terms of that contract.  Similarly, although the issue is hotly debated 
among legal scholars,134 one might reasonably assume that 
commercial parties want the language of their contract to be taken 
seriously and, thus, any interpretation thereof to be as literal as 
possible.  Conversely, one could expect that contract laws that allow 
a court to rewrite provisions of negotiated contracts, and to otherwise 
assess the fairness of their terms, to be viewed with suspicion. 
 
129 See, e.g., Pierre Crocq, Lacunes et limites de la loi au regard du droit des sûretés, 24 
RECUEIL DALLOZ 1354 (2007) (Fr.). 
130 See, e.g., Claude Witz, La fiducie française face aux expériences étrangères et à la 
convention de La Haye relative au trust, 20 RECUEIL DALLOZ 1369 (2007) (Fr.). 
131 See, e.g., Christian Larroumet, La loi du 19 février 2007 sur la fiducie, 9 RECUEIL 
DALLOZ 1350 (2007) (Fr.); Crocq, supra note 129. 
132 See Durand-Barthez, supra note 75, at 505. 
133 Indeed, many of the particularities of English law (for example, distinction between 
equity and common law, trust) are shared by other common law jurisdictions, including the 
laws of the various states in the United States, and their laws are not as successful.  By contrast, 
Switzerland is a civil law jurisdiction, and its laws are as successful as English law. 
134 See, e.g., Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Interpretation Redux, 119 YALE 
L.J. 926 (2010); STEVEN J. BURTON, ELEMENTS OF CONTRACT INTERPRETATION (2009). 
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Geoffrey Miller used his above-referenced study of over 2,800 
U.S. commercial contracts135 to test empirically these assumptions 
and this hypothesis.136  Miller’s analysis revealed that U.S. 
commercial parties chose New York state law in 46% of their 
contracts, while California state law was chosen in only 8% of 
them.137  Miller then set about comparing New York and California 
state law on a wide range of issues and finally concluded that the 
essential difference between the two could be found in their 
respective rules on interpretation and enforcement of contracts.  
While Miller characterized New York state judges as “formalists” 
with “little tolerance for attempts to rewrite contracts to make them 
fairer or more equitable” and found that they “look at the written 
agreement as the definitive source of interpretation,” he asserted the 
following about California judges:  
 
[They are] more willing to reform or reject contracts in the 
service of morality or public policy; it places less emphasis 
on the written agreement of the parties and seeks instead to 
identify the contours of their commercial relationship 
within a broader context framed by principles of reason, 
equity, and substantial justice.138  
 
Several American scholars cite Miller’s study as evidence that 
commercial parties prefer “formalist” or “textualist” contract laws 
(i.e., laws strictly enforcing the contract’s agreed-upon terms and 
relying on “plain meaning” rules of interpretation).139 
It is interesting to consider whether, in a similar vein, parties to 
international commercial transactions also prefer formalist contract 
laws.  However, the ICC arbitration data does not bear out such a 
conclusion, particularly with respect to the two preferred contract 
laws: English and Swiss.  Although English law has long been 
known for being very formalist, Swiss law places far less emphasis 
on written agreements and offers a variety of doctrines that enable 
courts to rewrite contracts to make them more equitable and fair. 
English law has traditionally been perceived as being much 
more textualist and as enforcing contractual obligations more strictly 
than the laws of European civil law jurisdictions.  English law places 
 
135 Eisenberg & Miller, Flight to New York, supra note 4. 
136 Geoffrey P. Miller, Bargains Bicoastal: New Light on Contract Theory, 31 CARDOZO 
L.R. 1475 (2010) [hereinafter Miller, Bargains Bicoastal]. 
137 Eisenberg & Miller, Flight to New York, supra note 4, at 1490. 
138 Miller, Bargains Bicoastal, supra note 136, at 1478. 
139 See, e.g., Schwartz & Scott, supra note 134, at 957. 
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a strong emphasis on written agreements, following an objective 
approach with respect to the determination of contractual terms and 
to contract interpretation.140  The intent of the parties is determined 
by objective criteria, such as the language used by the parties, rather 
than by subjective criteria.141  In this respect, its parole evidence 
rule—which excludes the use of extrinsic evidence to add to, vary, or 
contradict the plain meaning of the written terms of a contract—is 
key.142  English law also favors a more formalist approach to contract 
interpretation.  Interpretation focuses on the language in the 
document itself.  Unlike civil law jurisdictions, English law typically 
does not allow the consideration of pre-execution negotiations,143 or 
the manner in which performance has been rendered post-
execution,144 to determine the meaning of contractual clauses.  That 
is not to say that English courts inevitably interpret contracts in a 
formal, literal manner.  Although the general rule is, indeed, that 
words should be given their plain and ordinary meaning, it has long 
been accepted that drafting mistakes can be made.145  In these 
circumstances, a contextual interpretation is necessary, which will 
focus more on how reasonable commercial actors would construe the 
contract, rather than on how the particular actors might have 
interpreted it.146  More importantly, English courts are not easily 
convinced that the drafted language in a written contract did not, in 
fact, represent the intent of the parties at the time of execution, such 
that a resort to contextual interpretation is required.147  Finally, a 
characteristic feature of English law is its rejection of a duty of good 
 
140 See, e.g., JOHN CARTWRIGHT, CONTRACT LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ENGLISH 
LAW OF CONTRACT FOR THE CIVIL LAWYER 61 (1st ed. 2007). 
141 Id. at 62; see also Chartbrook Ltd. v. Persimmon Homes Ltd., [2009] UKHL 38 [39]. 
142 See generally Jack Beatson, Andrew Burrows & John Cartwright, ANSON’S LAW OF 
CONTRACT 138 (24th ed. 2010). 
143 Prenn v. Simmonds, [1971] 1 W.L.R. 1381 (H.L.); Chartbrook Ltd. v. Persimmon 
Homes Ltd., [2009] UKHL 38 (H.L.). 
144 L. Schuler AG v. Wickman Machine Tool Sales Ltd., [1974] A.C. 235 (H.L.) [252]. 
145 Investors Comp. Scheme Ltd. v. West Bromwich Bldg. Soc’y, [1997] UKHL 28. 
146 Prenn v. Simmonds, [1971] 1 W.L.R. 1381 (H.L.) [1384]; Mannai Invs. Co. Ltd. v. 
Eagle Star Life Assurance Co. Ltd., [1997] A.C. 749 (H.L.).  In recent years, the United 
Kingdom’s highest court has adopted such a purposive approach in a number of cases.  See, 
e.g., Re Sigma Fin. Corp. (in administration), [2009] UKSC 2.  In Chartbrook Ltd., for 
instance, Lord Hoffmann held that, as the literal meaning of a clause would make certain other 
provisions in the agreement appear arbitrary and irrational, the business purpose of the clause 
should be considered to interpret it.  Even if one considers these precedents as evidence of an 
ongoing evolution of English law towards a less textualist approach to contract law, the 
difference remains clear with the law of European civil law jurisdictions, and the perception of 
commercial actors probably even clearer. 
147 Investors Comp. Scheme Ltd. v. West Bromwich Bldg. Soc’y, [1997] UKHL 28. 
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faith in either the formation or the performance of the contract, 
which could be used to limit its strict enforcement in any way.148 
The other contract law preferred by international commercial 
actors—Swiss law—is far less formalist.  Like many other 
continental legal systems,149 Switzerland does not enforce contracts 
as strictly as England.  Rather, for the Swiss, the basic principle is 
that contracts are interpreted according to the common intent of the 
parties. For that purpose, what matters is the intent of the actual 
parties, rather than what a reasonable person would believe the 
contract meant.150  The written agreement is, of course, taken into 
consideration for determining what the parties actually wanted, but it 
is only one element among others.  Circumstances surrounding the 
negotiation and execution of the contract, as well as its subsequent 
performance, may also be taken into consideration.151  Not only does 
Switzerland eschew England’s parole evidence and plain meaning 
rules, but it does not even establish a hierarchy between the written 
agreement and extrinsic evidence.152  Thus, even when the written 
agreement is seemingly clear and unambiguous, extrinsic evidence is 
still admissible to demonstrate that the written agreement does not 
reflect the actual intent of the parties.153  Further, a general principle 
of Swiss contract law requires parties to exercise their rights and 
perform their obligations in good faith:154 the Swiss principle of good 
faith, like those of other European civil law systems, can result in the 
judicial creation of additional, accessory duties or obligations 
binding upon the parties,155 as well as judicial creation of default 
rules designed to supplement incomplete contracts in the absence of 
statutory default rules.156  Swiss law allows a court to modify the 
parties’ obligations due to changed circumstances in the absence of 
such a clause if it decides that the parties should have included such a 
clause, but failed to do so.157 
 
148 CARTWRIGHT, supra note 140, at 59. 
149 For the same conclusion regarding Germany, see Kötz, supra note 117, at 1248. 
150 PIERRE TERCIER & PASCAL PICHONNAZ, LE DROIT DES OBLIGATIONS 211 (5th ed. 
2012). 
151 Id. at 212. 
152 PIERRE TERCIER, LE DROIT DES OBLIGATIONS 174 (3rd ed. 2004). 
153 TERCIER & PICHONNAZ, supra note 150, at 212 (citing Tribunal fédéral [TF] [Federal 
Tribunal] Oct. 26, 2006, 133 [ATF] III 61; Tribunal fédéral [TF] [Federal Tribunal] Mar. 1, 2007, 
133 [ATF] III 280; Tribunal fédéral [TF] [Federal Tribunal] July 5, 2001, 127 [ATF] III 444). 
154 SCHWEIZERISCHES ZIVILGESETZBUCH [ZGB] [Civil Code] Dec. 10, 1907, SR 210, RS 
210, art. 2 (Switz.); TERCIER & PICHONNAZ, supra note 150, at 26. 
155 TERCIER & PICHONNAZ, supra note 150, at 64. 
156 Id. at 216. 
157 Id. at 217. 
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Obviously, the differences between English and Swiss law with 
respect to contract interpretation and enforcement are striking.158  In 
that regard, one could argue that Swiss and English law are as 
different as New York and California law.  However, unlike 
California, Switzerland does not seem to suffer from its far less 
formal approach to contract interpretation, since it is chosen only 
slightly less often than English law.  Why is that?  There are three 
possible explanations.  As the initial hypothesis suggested that 
commercial parties generally prefer more formalist/textualist contract 
law, one obvious explanation is that the hypothesis is simply wrong.  
Perhaps some, or even all, commercial parties find the distinction 
irrelevant or the distinction only makes a difference for certain types 
of transactions.  One could imagine, for instance, that parties to long-
term contracts might actually prefer a more contextualist approach, 
while parties to short-term contracts prefer more formalist laws.  
Another explanation could be that, while some commercial parties 
are highly sophisticated, others are not.  Sophisticated commercial 
parties would be expected to make informed decisions with respect 
to choosing the contract’s governing law, taking into account the 
important specific rules of each of the possibilities.  Unsophisticated 
commercial parties might make their decisions for other reasons.  For 
example, as discussed above, such parties might simply choose Swiss 
law because Switzerland is their preferred seat for any arbitration 
arising from the contract, despite the fact that there is no logical 
relationship between the choice of seat and choice of law.159  
Anecdotal evidence, however, seems to refute this particular 
conjecture, as major German corporations have a policy of choosing 
Swiss law and it is unlikely that many, or even some, of them would 
be considered to be unsophisticated parties.160  Yet a third possibility 
could be that decisions with respect to choice of law are made after 
taking into consideration a variety of factors.  One such factor is 
likely to be the appropriateness of the most important rules of a 
particular contract law, but it would not be the only, or even the most 
 
158 Eugen Bucher, Law of Contracts, in INTRODUCTION TO SWISS LAW 113 (F. 
Dessemontet and T. Ansay eds., 2d ed. 1995). 
159 See supra text accompanying notes 49–53. 
160 See, e.g., Vogenauer, supra note 28, at 36.  While German companies might play an 
important role in the success of Swiss contract law, they could not explain it alone.  The 
number of German parties in ICC arbitration is typically much lower than the number of parties 
providing for Swiss law (2012: 6.48% of German parties, 13.43% of parties providing for 
Swiss law; 2011: 5.15% of German parties, 11.9% of parties providing for Swiss law; 2010: 
7.41% of German parties, 11.6% of parties providing for Swiss law).  See also infra notes 162–
64 and accompanying text. 
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important, one.  In this scenario, parties weigh the intrinsic quality of 
a given contract law against other factors, perhaps resulting in the 
selection of a law that is less than optimal from a quality perspective 
but which is more appealing on other grounds. 
To properly assess the perception of Swiss law by commercial 
parties, it is important to mention the German debate on the so-called 
flight of German businesses from German to Swiss law.161  German 
legal practitioners are openly expressing concerns that they are losing 
business to Swiss legal practitioners.  Specifically, they are 
concerned that German parties active in international commerce 
choose Swiss, rather than German, law to avoid German law’s rather 
strict control of standard terms in B2B contracts.162  Ironically, it 
seems that Swiss law is perceived to be more formalist than German 
law insofar as Swiss law, unlike German law, does not enable courts 
to review contract terms.  A German courts’ power to police (and 
override) standard contract terms is not considered business friendly, 
such that it encourages German businesses to avoid their own law!  
The concerns of such German businesses and practitioners have 
become so great that a number of German interest groups have 
proposed reforms to Germany’s law of standard terms, some of 
which are expressly intended to improve the international 
competiveness of German contract law.163  These reforms, however, 
are not universally acclaimed: other interest groups, in particular 
small- and medium-sized businesses, view the existing German 
regime as some protection against the superior bargaining power of 
larger businesses and, therefore, resist any reforms.164 
Regardless of the success or failure of proposed reforms 
intended to make German law more competitive, the German debate, 
as well as the German actors’ perceptions of Swiss law, are not 
entirely consistent with theory that commercial parties prefer the 
most formalist contract laws.  Clearly, many Germans believe the 
flight from German law is due to that country’s contextual approach 
to contract law, leading businesses to seek more formalist laws.  But, 
 
161 See, e.g., Vogenauer, supra note 28, at 63. 
162 See, e.g., id.; Horst Eidenmüller, The Transnational Law Market, Regulatory Competition, 
and Transnational Corporations, 18 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 720 (2011). 
163 See, e.g., Vogenauer, supra note 28, at 64.  One proposal was prepared by the 
Committee for Private Law Matters of the German Bar Association.  Another was issued by the 
representative bodies of the machine building and electrical engineering industry, the Frankfurt 
Chamber of Commerce, and various practitioners and in-house counsels which had established 
an “Initiative for the Development of the Law of Standard Terms in Business Transactions” for 
that purpose.  Id. 
164 Vogenauer, supra note 28, at 65. 
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that cannot explain German businesses flight to Swiss law, which is 
far less formalist than other contract laws.  If German businesses are 
seeking more formalist contract laws, why hasn’t their flight from 
German law benefited English or New York law, for example?  Of 
course, one can always fall back on the notion that the underlying 
hypothesis—that commercial parties generally prefer more 
formalist/textualist contract laws—is simply wrong: some might and 
some might not, such that their preferences are hetero- rather than 
homogeneous.  Another explanation, as discussed above, is that the 
intrinsic quality of a particular contract law is just one factor taken 
into consideration when making such choices.  Perhaps German 
parties perceive Swiss law as a better choice than English or New 
York law because they expect it to be more familiar.  English 
contract law is based on common law doctrines, with unfamiliar 
concepts like consideration and equitable estoppel, while Swiss 
contract law relies on many doctrines that also exist in Germany.  
Moreover, Swiss law is available in German.165  One would not 
expect sophisticated parties to choose a law to govern their contract 
on the basis of such factors, but the fear of the unknown (which may 
be fueled, in part, by the rather ubiquitous notion that civil law and 
common law systems are so disparate that they are, essentially, 
incompatible, with both sides believing their system is “right” and 
the other “wrong”) may be a very powerful force indeed.  The lesson 
to be drawn from this may well be that international transactions are 
essentially different from domestic transactions, such that the 
relevance of Eisenberg and Miller’s study is limited to U.S. domestic 
transactions. 
 
IV.  FOUR HYPOTHESES ON PARTIES’ PREFERENCES 
 
In the previous Part, I sought to identify various factors that 
could explain the preferences of international commercial parties, 
which could, in turn, influence their choice of law in their contracts.  
I concluded, however, that none of those factors, alone, could explain 
my findings.  In particular, there is no discernible factor common to 
both English and Swiss law that explains their international 
attractiveness. 
Intuitively, one would think that parties’ preferences would be 
as heterogeneous as the parties, and their transactions, are.  After all, 
they have very diverse backgrounds and international commercial 
transactions are very diverse, as well.  Nevertheless, one would have 
 
165 See id. at 59. 
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expected such heterogeneity to lead to far greater diversity in the 
results.  But, the ICC Arbitration Data suggests that, essentially, 
international commercial parties resort to five laws out of more than 
200 and strongly prefer two among those five.  While being much 
more heterogeneous than the U.S. domestic situation, where one law 
clearly dominates, the preferences of international commercial 
parties actually seem quite homogeneous. 
An alternative and, perhaps, more convincing explanation might 
be that, while such parties have similar preferences, they address the 
issue of choice of law differently.  A first reason could be that they 
wish to invest different resources in the process of selecting the 
applicable law.  A second reason could be that their reasoning is 
bounded in a number of ways, which might explain why they are 
ready to make decisions on the basis of factors having varying 
degrees of relevance. 
 
A.  Sophisticated Parties Ready to Incur Necessary 
Transaction Costs 
 
One category of international commercial parties is composed 
of sophisticated actors who appreciate that choosing the law 
governing their contract subjects their relationship to the specific 
rules of the chosen contract law and who are ready to incur the 
necessary costs to study the content of that law.  As a result, the 
driving force in such parties’ choice is the content of the law.  Such 
parties, therefore, choose a given national law after verifying that its 
particular rules fit their needs. 
For them, the attractiveness of different contract laws is a 
function of the perceived qualities thereof.  Thus, the most attractive 
contract laws should be those that contain specific rules which best 
fit the needs of these commercial actors.  For such parties, English 
law or Swiss law is preferable because they perceive that some of the 
specific rules are better suited to them in contrast to rules existing in 
other contract laws. 
As previously noted, I have been unable to identify any rule 
common to both Swiss and English law that could explain their 
particular success.  On the contrary, English and Swiss law are 
markedly different with respect to a number of important issues, such 
as the manner of contract interpretation, the existence of an 
obligation of good faith, and the possibility of distinguishing legal 
and equitable ownership.166  Thus, if sophisticated parties are 
 
166 See supra Part III.B.3. 
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choosing specific contract laws based on their specific content, those 
parties would have to value different contract law rules, with some 
finding English rules more attractive and others finding Swiss rules 
more attractive.  How so?  Parties to short-term contracts might, for 
example, value strict enforcement of contractual terms, while parties 
to long-term contracts might consider a literal interpretation too 
restrictive, such that they prefer a contract law that gives courts tools 
to adapt initial obligations to changed circumstances.  I have, 
however, no evidence to back this supposition.167  Quite to the 
contrary, data collected by the Swiss Chambers’ Arbitration 
Institution168 suggests that international contracts providing for 
arbitration in Switzerland and the application of Swiss law are often 
short-term contracts.169 
Moreover, even if this second proffered explanation for the 
parties’ choices is correct, it only explains why Swiss and English 
law dominate the market.  But it would still beg the question of why 
other contract laws, which are similar to either Swiss or English law, 
are not chosen more often.  For example, if one assumes that English 
law is popular because it strictly enforces contractual terms, why is it 
that New York law, which shares that trait, is not more appealing to 
international commercial parties and, thus, chosen by them more 
often?  Recall that I have pooled the data with respect to ICC 
arbitrations in which the law of any U.S. State was chosen, to 
compare the choice of all U.S. contract laws to the choice of non-
U.S. contract laws and, as so pooled, the ICC Arbitration Data shows 
that U.S. law is chosen three times less often than English law.  
However, New York law, alone, represents half of the ICC 
arbitrations that chose any U.S. law, such that New York law, which 
shares many of the same features as English law, is approximately 
six times less attractive than English law.  Why is that? 
 
 
167 The ICC does not report on the specific contracts for which English or Swiss law was chosen. 
168 On the Swiss Chambers’ Arbitration Institution, see supra text accompanying notes 54–59.  
Between 2004 and 2012, parties choosing to resort to this institution provided for the 
application of Swiss contract law in 72% of the cases.  See supra notes 58–59. 
169 Between 2004 and 2012, the four most represented kinds of contracts in arbitration 
proceedings supervised by the Swiss Chambers’ Arbitration Institution were purchase and sale 
of goods (29%), purchase/sale of shares (13%), distribution/agency contracts (13%), and 
service contracts (10%).  See ARBITRATION STATISTICS 2012, supra note 56.  While those 
categories are not defined by the authors of the statistics, it seems that contracts belonging to 
the first two would mostly be short-term contracts. 
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B.  Sophisticated Parties Unwilling to Incur Necessary 
Transaction Costs 
 
Another category of international commercial actor might well 
appreciate the importance of the law governing their transactions, but 
be unwilling to incur the cost of exploring and understanding the 
content of foreign contract laws.  For this reason, they would first try 
to secure the application of their own law.  If the other party has the 
same mindset, the two would be unlikely to agree on one of their 
own contract laws, making it highly plausible that they will settle on 
a third state law.  Parties unwilling to incur the costs of verifying the 
content thereof, much less comparing the content of several third-
state laws, would eventually choose the applicable law for reasons 
other than the quality thereof. 
To verify the content of a foreign contract law typically 
involves hiring local counsel (i.e., a lawyer trained in that particular 
contract law), even if the party already has outside counsel.  One 
might expect that, in light of the sheer volume of international 
contracts executed each day, parties often negotiate their transactions 
without the benefit of any lawyer, or at least without any outside 
counsel, as lawyers can significantly increase the cost of a 
transaction.  Rather, such parties might well rely on their own in-
house knowledge (including, perhaps, the expertise of in-house 
counsel).  But, such internal knowledge will typically be limited to 
knowledge of their jurisdiction’s law.  Moreover, while still other 
parties may use the services of attorneys in their negotiations, such 
attorneys will typically be the parties’ habitual lawyers, schooled in 
the law of the party’s jurisdiction.170 
Thus, in virtually every case in which the specter of a foreign 
law arises, local counsel is likely to be needed to truly understand the 
implications of the choice, but the circumstances of the particular 
transaction may make seeking such expertise neither timely nor cost-
effective.  So, parties may end up choosing the applicable law 
without having the relevant information on the particularities of any 
contract law other than their own.  One can only assume that, when 
this situation arises, the parties make their decision on other grounds. 
If sophisticated parties (i.e., parties who understand the 
importance of the law governing their contract),171 find themselves in 
 
170 An important issue is whether competent and ethical lawyers should actually advise 
their clients to seek local expertise before agreeing to subject their contract to any foreign law.  
I leave this issue for further research. 
171 For unsophisticated parties, see infra Part IV.D. 
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such a situation, one would expect them to either (i) seek the relevant 
information on the content and qualities of foreign laws in a time-
efficient and cost-effective manner or (ii) try to assess its qualities 
indirectly, using proxies. 
The first approach—seeking inexpensive and easily accessible 
information about a particular contract law might be sufficient for 
some international commercial actor and they may make their choice 
on this basis.  In this regard, marketing materials (such as the 
brochure published by the Law Society of England and Wales), 
which provide brief explanations of the general features of a contract 
law, might prove quite useful; such materials are made available for 
free, are generally a very quick read, and make reasonably 
convincing arguments. 
Likewise, such parties might be sensitive to arguments that a 
given contract law offers a mix of legal cultures and systems, such 
that it shares a number of rules and doctrines with other legal 
systems (perhaps the actor’s own contract law).  Indeed, such 
statements might offer some comfort to such parties, allowing them 
to believe that any additional time and expense associated with 
understanding the specific content of such mixed laws (e.g., the cost 
of hiring local counsel) is simply not worthwhile.  Rather, such 
parties might think that, having already decided (for whatever 
reason) that knowing the specific rules of the chosen law is not an 
option, the next best thing is to choose a law that has commonalities 
with many other laws and is, therefore, likely to contain some 
familiar rules. 
The other approach to choosing a law, for sophisticated parties 
unable or unwilling to incur the costs of verifying the specific 
content of third state laws, is to seek indirect assessment of the 
quality of such contract laws through proxies.  The most obvious 
proxy is the opinion expressed by other commercial actors (either 
directly or indirectly).  International commercial parties might simply 
want to follow the most common practice in their particular trade.  If 
they hear that similarly situated parties often provide for English law 
or that they typically designate Switzerland both as the venue for 
arbitration and the applicable law, they might think that it is safe to 
do the same.172  Moreover, if a standard form contract provides a 
default contract law in the absence of the parties’ specific choice of a 
 
172 See Vogenauer, supra note 28, at 60 (“It seems that many parties to international 
transactions choose English law simply because they assume that others do the same.”).  
Vogenauer also argues that parties choosing a law often chosen by other parties would benefit 
from a network effect.  Id. at 25. 
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different one, the parties may simply stick with the default law, as 
the form’s drafter obviously thought it would be acceptable. 
 
C.  Sophisticated Parties Bounded Rationally 
 
A third category of international commercial parties might 
appreciate the importance of the law governing their transactions, but 
suffer from cognitive limitations, which would prevent them from 
making a fully rational choice. 
An important development of law and economics scholarship in 
the last 15 years has been the recognition that the rationality 
assumption of traditional law and economics scholarship is often 
mistaken, and that actors suffer various cognitive limitations that 
bound their rationality.173  The project of behavioral law and 
economics scholarship is to identify such cognitive limitations and 
predict how actors really behave when suffering them.174  While most 
of the findings of these scholars do not seem to be directly relevant 
for the purpose of this Article, there are two cognitive limitations that 
might regularly influence choice of law in international contracts. 
The first is choice overload.175  As noted, parties agreeing to 
arbitrate their disputes may choose the contract law of any state in 
the world.  They therefore have more than 200 options.176  Some 
parties might be overwhelmed by the range of available choices.  As 
a result, they may simply decide not to make use of the possibility to 
compare even a small number of laws.  They could either abdicate 
the decision-making entirely, and not choose any law at all, or stick 
to the habitual choice of governing law.177  The psychology literature 
has long identified the risks of decisional paralysis178 or of status quo 
 
173 See generally Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision 
Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499 (1998) (describing 
many applications in legal fields other than antitrust fifteen years ago); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Behavioral Law and Economics: A Progress Report, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 115, 115 (1999) 
(describing a “flood” of behaviorally oriented legal research existing in 1999). 
174 See generally Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral 
Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998); Russell B. Korobkin & 
Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law 
and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051 (2000). 
175 See Low, supra note 28, at 373. 
176 See supra text accompanying note 13. 
177 Low, supra note 28, at 373. 
178 See, e.g., Barry Schwartz, Self-determination: The Tyranny of Freedom 55 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 79 (2000); BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE PARADOX OF CHOICE (2004); Sheena 
Iyengar & Mark Lepper, When Choice is Demotivating: Can One Desire Too Much of a Good 
Thing?, 79 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 995 (2000). 
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bias arising out of choice overload.179 
The finding that parties might suffer from choice overload is 
useful to explain why a number of commercial do not make any 
choice of law in their contracts.  It may also suggest that many 
parties would not change easily their preferences with respect to 
choice of law, and that lawmakers eager to compete on the market 
for contracts might have to invest significant resources to succeed.  
But cognitive limitations preventing parties from making choices 
will not, by definition, help understand why (other) parties positively 
choose certain laws. 
Another cognitive limitation that could be relevant for the 
purpose of this Article is the fear of the unknown.  An important 
lesson of prospect theory180 is that actors have a strong preference for 
certainty and are willing to sacrifice income to achieve more 
certainty.181  In the context of international contracting, this finding 
might explain why some parties would strongly prefer to choose a 
law which is perceived to be similar to their own.  They would 
highly value avoiding risks of being surprised by the content of the 
chosen law, and might thus be ready to prefer a law less adapted to 
their needs but closer to their own and thus more familiar.182 
A number of scholars have speculated that parties might prefer 
to choose a foreign law that resembles their own as closely as 
possible.183  One explanation for the success of Swiss law could be 
that parties originating from civil law jurisdictions would prefer to 
choose Swiss law because of its commonalities with the laws of 
several civil law jurisdictions, namely French and German law.  
Some parties might also have a preference for laws enforcing strictly 
promises.  For this reason, they might prefer to provide for the 
application of a formalist law.  However, their preference for 
certainty would prevent them from choosing the law of common law 
jurisdiction even if it were more formalist than the law of any civil 
law jurisdiction.  This might be the explanation for the practice of 
German businesses seeking to avoid the German regime of standard 
terms to provide for the application of Swiss law.184 
 
179 See, e.g., William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision 
Making, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7 (1988); Daniel Kahneman et. al., Anomalies: The 
Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193 (1991). 
180 Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under 
Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979). 
181 Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 174, at 123. 
182 Vogenauer, supra note 28, at 25. 
183 Id. 
184 See supra text accompanying notes 162–65. 
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D.  Unsophisticated Parties 
 
Finally, a fourth category of international commercial parties 
undoubtedly exists: parties who simply fail to fully appreciate the 
importance of their choice of law to govern their contracts because 
they are unsophisticated from a legal point of view.  It would be 
absurd to believe that all parties concluding contracts, even 
international commercial ones, fully comprehend the importance of 
the law they select.  Most of them are, after all, businessmen and, 
although some may have some legal training, most will not and some 
will have no higher education at all. 
The extent of international commercial actors’ lack of legal 
sophistication can vary substantially.  Some parties might simply ignore 
the legal aspect of their transaction; they would probably be happy not 
to include any choice of law clause in their contract, in the hope that the 
transaction works exactly as agreed and requires no resort to the law to 
enforce it.  One can imagine that thousands of such transactions are 
concluded each and every day without the need to resort to external 
dispute resolution.  And, if a more sophisticated party confronts such 
parties with the issue, they might simply concede to the other party’s 
proposal or may even try to obtain some small advantage in exchange 
for conceding to that other party’s preferred law. 
Still other unsophisticated parties might have a better sense of 
the significance of the law governing their transaction, but still fail to 
understand all implications of a choice of law.  They might, for 
example, wrongly believe that the issue of the applicable law is 
related to other issues that are, in truth, unrelated.  As a consequence, 
they may make such choices relying on factors that are simply 
irrelevant.  It is, of course, difficult to speculate on how unsophisticated 
parties might err.  One mistake, however, is undoubtedly very common: 
the confusion between choice of venue and choice of law.  For 
unsophisticated parties, it is likely that choosing a court or the seat of the 
arbitration is indistinguishable from choosing the law applicable to the 
contract.  Such mistake can result in two different behaviors.  On the 
one hand, such parties might neglect to choose the applicable law 
after choosing the venue, as they will fail to appreciate the difference 
between the two.185  On the other, they might feel that choice of 
venue dictates choice of law, such that they believe it natural to choose 
the same jurisdiction for both.  This second alternative could, in fact, 
 
185 The ICC reports that 20% of parties to ICC arbitrations, who will have provided in most 
cases for the venue of the arbitration, do not provide an applicable law. 
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explain the success of Swiss contract law.186  Switzerland is one of the 
most successful venues for international arbitration in Europe; Swiss 
contract law might benefit from that success because many parties 
believe that choosing Switzerland as the venue entails choosing Swiss 
contract law.  To prove this hypothesis, however, would require an 
analysis of data from other arbitral institutions and an exploration of the 
extent to which parties who choose a different seat for their arbitration 
choose Swiss law.187 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
This Article is based on an empirical study of the data published by 
one arbitral institution.  While parties to ICC arbitrations are very 
diverse, I have noted that European parties are overrepresented and 
American and Asian parties are underrepresented.188  The study could be 
complemented by a study of cases arbitrated under the aegis of the 
major arbitral institutions in Asia and in the Americas.189 
From the perspective of the United States, an important question 
would be whether the study of Asian and American cases would 
confirm the poor performance of U.S. state laws in general and New 
York law in particular.  Received wisdom is that English and New York 
law dominates international business transactions.  This study and the 
preliminary results of the study of Asian data reveal that the truth of the 
matter might well be that New York is far from being a serious 
competitor to English law.  This finding, if confirmed, would be 
counterintuitive as the contents of English and New York law are very 
similar.  Is New York law suffering from the incomprehension and fear 
that the American legal system inspires to the rest of the world?190  I 
leave this question for further research.  
 
186 See also supra Part III.A.1. 
187 This author is currently conducting such a study in Asia.  The preliminary results for 
Singapore and Hong Kong are that parties choosing to arbitrate in either Singapore or Hong 
Kong virtually never provide for the application of Swiss law, but often provide for the 
application of English law or the law of the seat of the arbitration (i.e. either Singapore or Hong 
Kong law). 
188 See supra text accompanying notes 23–25. 
189 Unfortunately, while major Asian institutions have agreed to provide the necessary data, 
the American Arbitration Association has so far not responded to any of my inquiries. 
190 See Stefan Vogenauer, Civil Justice Systems in Europe: Implications for Choice of 
Forum and Choice of Contract Law—A Business Survey—Final Results (2008) (U.S. law is the 
first contract law the choice of which European businesses try to avoid (21%), the laws of 
Islamic countries ranking second (13%)). 
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APPENDIX.  ICC Data 
 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Number of Cases 599 663 817 793 796 759 
% choice of national laws 0.79299 0.84 0.8678 0.82 0.8232 0.85 
Parties 1611 1758 2095 2145 2293 2036 
 
Switzerland % of parties 2.42086 2.96 3.01 2.38 2.83 2.9 
 
% of parties 
(weighted) 1.42758 1.8754 2.0372 1.443 1.6174 1.8379 
% of choice of 
law 10.2 9.5 13.1 11.6 11.9 13.43 
Seat 82 77 109 79 88 122 
Attractiveness 8.77242 7.6246 11.063 10.16 10.283 11.592 
 
England % of parties 4.28305 3.19 3.53 3.12 3.84 2.4 
 
% of parties 
(weighted) 2.52571 2.0211 2.3891 1.892 2.1947 1.521 
% of choice of 
law 11.9 13 14.3 12.9 10.7 16.95 
Seat 53 56 67 46 59 71 
Attractiveness 9.37429 10.979 11.911 11.01 8.5053 15.429 
 
USA % of parties 8.44196 10.35 7.78 8.67 6.76 7.12 
 
% of parties 
(weighted) 4.97821 6.5576 4.8443 5.257 3.8636 4.5122 
% of choice of 
law 7.1 6.7 7.1 10.1 10.6 9.78 
NY law (%) 3.5 4.1875 3.124 4.747 5.4272 5.5746 
Seat 36 29 31 42 43 41 
Attractiveness 2.12179 0.1424 2.2557 4.843 6.7364 5.2678 
 
France % of parties 6.45562 7.22 7.35 6.11 6.28 6.09 
 
% of parties 
(weighted) 3.36761 4.2143 4.5766 3.705 3.5893 3.8595 
% of choice of 
law 6.7 7.3 7.2 6.6 7.2 7.17 
Seat 86 73 94 109 92 101 
Attractiveness 3.33239 3.0857 2.6234 2.895 3.6107 3.3105 
 
Germany % of parties 9.80757 7.85 6.87 7.41 5.15 6.48 
 
% of parties 
(weighted) 5.41746 4.7213 4.2777 4.493 2.9434 4.1067 
% of choice of 
law 7.2 4.8 6 8.2 6.6 5.35 
Seat 21 35 37 24 39 19 
Attractiveness 1.78254 0.0787 1.7223 3.707 3.6566 1.2433 
 
